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FAITH IN STRASBOURG AND LUXEMBOURG? THE FRESH
RISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LITIGATION IN THE PANEUROPEAN COURTS
John Witte, Jr.*
Andrea Pin**
ABSTRACT
The religious landscape of Europe has changed dramatically in the past two
generations. Traditional Christian establishments have been challenged by the
growth of religious pluralism and strong new movements of laïcité and
secularism. Once powerful religious cultures have been shattered by exposures
of clerical abuses and financial self-dealing, leading to emptier pews and
waning political influence. Once quiet, homogenous European communities are
now home to large groups of new Muslim emigrants, making new demands and
sparking strong anti-immigrant movements. Once strictly controlled national
borders have opened across Eastern and Western Europe, leading to massive
migration and tense local intermixtures of Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants,
Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Confucians, Hindus, Atheists, and Secularists never
seen on this scale before. Old constitutions, concordats, and customs that
privileged local forms and forums of Christian identity and morality have come
under increasing attack. A single mention of God in the proposed new European
Constitution triggered continent-wide debate. Old Christian Europe is dying; a
new religious and political order is beginning to form.
These new religious movements have reshaped the religious freedom law not
only of individual European states but also of the European Court of Human
Rights sitting in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the European Union
sitting in Luxembourg. These two pan-European Courts have become new
hotspots for religious freedom claimants from all over Europe. The rapidly
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expanding case law of these two Courts reflects the transition and tenuousness
of European law and religion. Both Courts do often repeat and apply firmly the
core religious freedom mandates of the 1950 European Convention of Human
Rights and the 2010 European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Liberties and
their statutory echoes—freedom of thought, conscience, and belief for all;
freedom from direct and indirect discrimination by state and private actors;
freedom to manifest one’s beliefs in public, alone, and in religious groups that
deserve legal personality and religious autonomy. Both Courts have emphasized
the need for State neutrality toward religion, for strong protections of religious
pluralism, and for ample deference to local political traditions. Both Courts
have also stepped in to remove blatant religious discrimination by some state
officials.
But both these pan-European Courts have also been notably churlish of late
in their treatment of both Muslim and conservative Christian claimants, even
while generously accommodating self-professed Atheists, Agnostics, and
Secularists. Both Courts have repeatedly rejected requests by religious
claimants to protect their religious dress, jewelry, dietary rules, holiday
observance, and traditional beliefs about sex, marriage, and family, in each
instance privileging the rights of others and the interests of democratic society
over the claims of religious freedom. Both Courts have repeatedly held against
Eastern European Orthodox state policies on religion, even while granting wide
margins of appreciation to French, Belgian, Swiss, and other States’ policies
that blatantly targeted religious minorities, especially Muslims. And
particularly the Luxembourg Court has begun to second-guess internal church
employment decisions long protected by religious autonomy norms, and to
question longstanding constitutional forms of church-state relations, even
though the European Treaty formally protects them.
This Article offers a detailed comparative analysis of the religious freedom
jurisprudence of these two pan-European Courts. It outlines their approaches
to the variety of religious traditions and church-state models within the Old
Continent and the principles and precepts of religious freedom that they have
developed to date. This Article analyzes how the two Courts operate and
highlights the reality that the Strasbourg Court issues only soft law that depends
on individual state compliance, while the Luxembourg Court issues hard law
that is binding throughout the European Union. This reality is rapidly making
the Luxembourg Court an attractive forum for transnational litigation, including
on religious freedom. This is a worrisome trend for the future of religious
freedom, however, for the Luxembourg Court has been notably less
accommodating than the Strasbourg Court of religious freedom claims, more
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insistent on state neutrality on religion even at the cost of religious exemptions,
and more willing to unsettle longstanding church-state models and cooperative
arrangements.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 590
I. RELIGION IN EUROPE ......................................................................... 593
A. Religion in the Council of Europe and European Union ........ . 593
B. New Religious Changes and Challenges .................................. 596
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE TWO COURTS ....................................... 599
A. The European Court of Human Rights ..................................... 599
B. The Court of Justice of the European Union ............................ 602
III. THE CASES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE TWO COURTS .............. 605
A. Rights of Thought, Conscience, and Belief ............................... 607
1. Conscientious Objection and the Military .......................... 608
2. Conscientious Objection in the Workplace ........................ 610
3. Religion and Education, Students and Parents .................. 612
4. Coercion and Religious Worship of Prisoners ................... 616
5. Religious Freedom for Refugees ......................................... 618
B. Regulation of the Public Manifestations of Religion ................ 621
1. Proselytism and Its Legal Limits ........................................ 622
2. Holy Days and Salary ......................................................... 624
3. Religious Dress Cases in the European Court of Human
Rights .................................................................................. 626
4. Religious Dress Cases in the Court of Justice of the
European Union ................................................................. 633
5. Religious Slaughtering Restrictions ................................... 635
C. Religious Group Protections .................................................... 638
1. Religious Personality, Autonomy and Legal Limits ........... 638
2. Religious Employers and Labor Rights .............................. 645
3. State Aid for Religious Groups ........................................... 652
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 654

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

590

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:587

INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom litigation in Europe is on the rise, with likely
ramifications spilling well beyond the Old Continent. While religious freedom
has always been part of the constitutional and regulatory laws of each European
country,1 two pan-European Courts are now hard at work on these issues as well.
They have gained prominence in religious freedom litigation, functioning as
hotspots for religious freedom claims that affect countries across Europe and
well beyond.
The first pan-European Court to take up religious freedom cases is the
European Court of Human Rights sitting in Strasbourg (the “ECtHR” or
“Strasbourg Court”). The ECtHR has jurisdiction over religious freedom under
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950).2 This provision
guarantees to each person “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” the
right to “change” religion or belief, and “freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his [or her] religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.”3 From 1950, when the Convention
was ratified, until 1993 when it issued its first Article 9 case of Kokkinakis v.
Greece,4 the Court remained largely silent on religious freedom.5 But since then,
the ECtHR has delivered more than 150 judgments on the merits on this topic.6
The Court has generally interpreted Article 9 and related articles broadly to
protect the religious freedom of most individuals and groups. These claimants
have won some two-thirds of their cases, although the Court of late has been
notoriously hard on Muslim minorities and conservative Christian claimants
alike. These Article 9 and related cases have fed European scholarship and the
global human rights agenda and provided Member States with an uninterrupted
flow of judgments that progressively unfold the scope and meaning of religious
freedom and other fundamental rights.
The ECtHR’s rulings, however, are only soft law in the forty-seven Member
States of the Council of Europe. A State found in violation of Article 9 or any
other article of the Convention is formally obliged to comply with the Court’s
1

NORMAN DOE, LAW AND RELIGION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 40 (2011).
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, ¶ 1–2, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter Convention].
3
Id. See infra note 54 for full text and related provisions.
4
Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 1993 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (May 25, 1993).
5
Carolyn Evans, Pre-Kokkinakis Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights: Foreshadowing
the Future, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 13 (Jeroen
Temperman, T. Jeremy Gunn & Malcolm Evans eds., 2019).
6
See infra note 64.
2
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rulings and to remove the reasons for the injustice so far as it is possible. But
this compliance is basically left to each Member State’s good will and
cooperation and is dependent on how concerned they are about their religious
freedom and broader human rights record. Many Member States have ignored
the Court’s rulings against them largely with legal impunity, even if at some
diplomatic cost.7 Moreover, the ECtHR’s judgment against one State in a case
is not binding on any other States.8 While some States have revised their
domestic legislation or reformed their case law in light of the Court’s judgments,
they have no legal obligation to do so, and many States in fact have made no
such changes. Moreover, Russia’s and Turkey’s failures to contribute to the
expenses of the Council of Europe have posed further obstacles to the Court’s
work.9
The Court of Justice of the European Union, sitting in Luxembourg (the
“CJEU” or “Luxembourg Court”)10 has become a pivotal new player in religious
freedom cases and is rapidly emerging as “the new boss of religious freedom”11
in Europe—at least in the twenty-seven Member States left in the European
Union (EU) after Brexit.12 Before the 2010 Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union,13 EU laws made only indirect references to religious
freedom and produced little case law. Even when Article 10 of the Charter gave
specific religious freedom protection for citizens of EU countries (tracking the
language of Article 9 of the Convention),14 the CJEU remained largely silent on
the subject until 2017.15 Since then, however, the CJEU has delivered a dozen
landmark rulings on religious freedom, and many other cases are pending.

7
Janneke Gerards, The European Court of Human Rights and the National Courts: Giving Shape to the
Notion of ‘Shared Responsibility’, in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE ECTHR IN NATIONAL CASE-LAW 27 (Jenneke Gerards & Joseph Fleuren eds., 2014).
8
T. Jeremy Gunn, Jeroen Temperman & Malcolm Evans, Introduction to THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF, supra note 5, at 2.
9
Mikhail Bushuev & Markian Ostapchuk, Russian Withholds Payments to the Council of Europe,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://p.dw.com/p/2tYKP.
10
It was only in late 2009 that the CJEU took this name; before then, it was called European Court of
Justice. Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/
court-justice-european-union-cjeu_en (last visited Dec. 22, 2020). For the sake of simplicity and clarity, this
Article will make no temporal distinction and will use the name of CJEU.
11
Andrea Pin & John Witte, Jr., Meet the New Boss of Religious Freedom: The New Cases of the Court
of Justice of the European Union, 55 TEX. J. INT’L L. 223, 226 (2020).
12
Id. at 225.
13
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389
[hereinafter Charter].
14
Id. art. 10.
15
Pin & Witte, supra note 11, at 225.
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Unlike the ECtHR’s rulings, the CJEU’s rulings are hard law for all Member
States of the European Union, immediately binding on every State and
preemptive of local laws to the contrary.16 The CJEU thus has much more legal
power than the ECtHR, and its religious freedom docket is likely to grow
rapidly. Since the CJEU’s rulings are good law throughout the EU, override all
domestic legislation, and guide future local cases, religious freedom litigants
have used the CJEU to shape domestic law.17 Whoever wins in Luxembourg
wins in her hometown, and the new judgment will affect the entire EU. This has
incentivized local religious freedom litigants, particularly those with broader
European interests or constituents, to appeal to EU law and the EU Charter, with
the goal of using the Luxembourg Court as leverage to produce both local and
regional reforms on religious freedom. So far, the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Courts have produced comparable religious freedom jurisprudence, but the latter
Court has already shown less sympathy for religious freedom claims of
minorities and less deference to religious autonomy and traditional religion-state
arrangements.
This Article offers a comparative analysis of the religious freedom
jurisprudence of these two pan-European Courts. It explains how and why this
supranational litigation has emerged, how it takes shape in each Court, and what
differences are emerging in the religious freedom jurisprudence of the ECtHR
and CJEU. Part I briefly sketches the social, political, and religious context of
the Council of Europe and the European Union, and how both Courts have
acknowledged the importance of religion for private and public life. Part II
describes how the two Courts operate, the status of their case law at the domestic
level, and the reasons that the CJEU is rising in importance. Part III synthesizes
the two Courts’ case law in the field of religious freedom from three different
angles: (1) freedom of thought, conscience, and belief; (2) the regulation of
public manifestations of religion; and (3) freedom of religious groups. The
Conclusion not only evaluates the many notable advances in religious freedom
jurisprudence offered by both Courts, but also signals the dangers to religious
freedom suggested by some of the most recent cases.

16

Id. at 223.
See ELINA PAUNIO, LEGAL CERTAINTY IN MULTILINGUAL EU LAW: LANGUAGE, DISCOURSE AND
REASONING AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 59 (2013); Morten Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal
Revolution – The Early History of the European Court of Justice, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 77, 77 (2008).
17
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RELIGION IN EUROPE

The place of religion in Europe has been one of the most intractable
controversies in recent decades,18 and it has shaped the religious freedom
narrative and jurisprudence of both the pan-European courts. These Courts now
regularly face religious freedom issues concerning the place of religious
symbols, dress, and ornamentation in public life; charges of religious
discrimination in public and in the workplace; issues of religion in schools and
charities; challenges to local forms and forums of both religious establishment
and secularization (called laïcité in France and Belgium); legal limitations to
religious worship, organization, proselytization, diet, dress, and other forms of
religious expression; asylum claims by religious refugees; conscientious
objections to oaths, military participation, and various public policies; clashes
between religious liberty and other fundamental rights, particularly concerning
sexual liberty and identity; claims of freedom and autonomy by religious groups
to govern their polity, property, leadership, and membership; and much more. In
addressing these and other cases, these two pan-European Courts have sought to
apply general European religious freedom norms to Member States with ample
constitutional, cultural, and religious diversity, and with new and rapid changes
and challenges concerning the place of religion.19
A. Religion in the Council of Europe and European Union
The ECtHR has jurisdiction over all forty-seven Member States within the
Council of Europe. This territory includes Western European lands, some with
strong and longstanding Roman Catholic and Protestant populations, others with
strong movements of secularism and laïcité.20 The Council of Europe also
includes Eastern European lands, the Russian Federation, and former Soviet bloc
countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, each with strong
Orthodox Christian populations along with smaller communities of Catholic,
Protestant, Islamic, Jewish, and other religious minorities.21 And it includes

18
Julie Ringelheim, State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the
European Court of Human Rights Approach, 6 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 24, 25 (2017).
19
See, e.g., Andrea Pin, Does Europe Need Neutrality? The Old Continent in Search of Identity, 2014
BYU L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2014) (discussing legal variations of neutrality and religious freedom across Member
States).
20
LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LANDSCAPE 4 (2012).
21
47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states (last
visited Dec. 22, 2020); Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially, PEW F. (Oct. 3,
2017), https://www.pewforum.org/2017/10/03/many-countries-favor-specific-religions-officially-or-unofficially/.
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Greece with its strong Orthodox populations and Turkey with its Islamic
majority.22
The ECtHR has struggled to develop a universal religious freedom
jurisprudence that applies consistently across this diverse religious and cultural
field. The European Convention is silent on the status of local religion-state
relations and the roles and rights of religious expression, practices, officials, and
institutions in the political and public sphere,23 leaving the ECtHR to work out
these questions through its case law. The Court now frequently uses such words
as “neutrality,” “living together,” “religious choice,” and even “secularism” to
address these questions.24 But these terms do not appear in the Convention,25
and the Court has not developed a universal or consistent definition or
application of them in its case law.26 Moreover, the ECtHR often—though not
always of late27—uses these terms to justify state limitations on public
expressions of religion, particularly by Islamic or Christian religious minorities
when they are out of step with local secular fashions or with local religious
establishments.28
Religion has been a hot topic for the CJEU as well, even though the twentyseven countries of the European Union have less religious and legal diversity,
given the absence of Turkey, Russia, and most former Soviet bloc countries, and
now, since Brexit, the United Kingdom as well. While the EU Charter has
comparable provisions on religious freedom to those in the European
Convention, EU law goes further and explicitly requires “respect [for] . . . the
status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities
in the Member States.”29 The CJEU thus accommodates a variety of local
22
W. Cole Durham Jr. & David M. Kirkham, Introduction to ISLAM, EUROPE, AND EMERGING LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 7 (W. Cole Durham Jr., Rik Torfs, David M. Kirkham & Christine Scott eds., 2012).
23
Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human Rights’
Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 627, 646
(2011).
24
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 359 ¶ 82, 366 ¶ 103, 372 ¶ 127;
Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R 81, 108 ¶ 98; see Şahin v.
Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 222–23 ¶ 4–7 (Tulken, J., dissenting).
25
T. Jeremy Gunn, The “Principle of Secularism” and the European Court of Human Rights: A Shell
Game, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF, supra note 5,
at 473, 572.
26
Ronan McCrea, Secularism Before the Strasbourg Court: Abstract Constitutional Principles as a Basis
for Limiting Rights, 79 MOD. L. REV. 691, 703 (2016) (stating “on how best to arrange the relationship between
religion and state in Europe, . . . the Court has consistently adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach”).
27
See infra case Gldani at note 431 and Dimitrova at note 442.
28
Gunn, supra note 25, at 573.
29
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 17, ¶ 1, June 7, 2016,
2016 O.J. (C 202) 42 [hereinafter TFEU].
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constitutional arrangements on religion and state—aggressive policies of laïcité
in France and Belgium; formal religious establishments of Orthodoxy in Greece
and Lutheranism in Scandinavia; and cultural and legal favoritism of various
forms of Catholicism or Protestantism in other States and local regions.30
Another EU provision guarantees that EU laws will not affect a Member State’s
rights or obligations “arising from agreements” that a Member State concluded
with another country before joining the EU.31 This provision covers various
State agreements with the Holy See, which are a constitutional staple in
predominantly Catholic states of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, and Hungary—
although EU law now recommends that its Member States “take all the
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities” between these older
agreements and current EU law.32
This formal legal deference to local church-state relationships, however,
coexists with heated debates over the public visibility and role of religion within
the European Union and beyond. The EU has struggled to define its
constitutional identity, including whether and how to take account of its religious
heritage and diversity.33 That struggle culminated in the early 2000s, when the
Member States intensely debated a proposed EU Constitution. The first draft
referenced Europe’s religious tradition in the Preamble, and this raised ample
controversy.34 Some advocates wanted explicit recognition of Europe’s long
Christian heritage and the sundry contributions of churches to the development
of European culture; others wanted no mention of religion at all both to avoid
partisanship and to underscore the EU’s neutrality toward religion.35 The
drafters sought a via media that recognized the variety of religious heritages and
constitutional arrangements on religion within the Member States, while
establishing a common framework for EU government.36 That move, too, raised
controversy. In the end, the final proposed Constitution dropped all references
to Christianity and any other religions.37 This led to inevitable charges that the
30
See generally BRENT F. NELSEN & JAMES L. GUTH, RELIGION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN
UNION (2015).
31
TFEU, supra note 29, art. 351.
32
Id.
33
NELSEN & GUTH, supra note 30, at 66–110; PATRICK PASTURE, IMAGINING EUROPEAN UNITY SINCE
1000 AD, at 204 (2015).
34
Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Christian Europe? Europe and Christianity: Rules of Commitment, 6 EUR. VIEW
143, 143 (2007).
35
Pin, supra note 19, at 605.
36
Memorandum from Praesidium on Draft Constitution, Volume 1 to The European Convention (May
28, 2003), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=CV%20724%202003%20REV%201.
37
Preamble of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 3
(“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy,
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EU now preferred secularism over religious pluralism, and political expediency
over historical authenticity.38 The EU Constitution was not ratified when put to
a vote in 2005, and the Union has since tabled debates about the EU Constitution,
including its religious foundations and dimensions. But any new talk of EU
constitutional ratification will no doubt raise this issue sharply anew.
B. New Religious Changes and Challenges
Three other new factors have helped to bring religion back into public
prominence and debate, complicating the religious freedom jurisprudence of
both Courts: (1) shifts in European religious demography, (2) the rise of Islam,
and (3) various scandals within European churches.
First, European politics and culture have experienced a rapid new awakening
of religion. “With the disappearance of the East-West divide, which had pushed
all other conflicts into the background” for decades after World War II, Dieter
Grimm writes, “religion and religious communities reappeared on the public
scene and began to insist more vigorously on respect for their beliefs and on
living according to the commandments of their creed.”39 This has given birth to
“a process of re-politicization of religion”40 throughout Europe, with many new
religious players participating. The freedom of movement guaranteed by EU
treaties has mobilized people of different cultures and faiths to move to other
EU Countries, seeking new homes, new work, better schools, more generous
welfare systems, and more.41 Moreover, the geographical expansion of the
Council of Europe into the former Soviet bloc and Turkey, and the porousness
of its borders has accordingly transformed the religious makeup of its State
Members. Orthodox Christians living in Eastern Europe, for example, have
relocated to the West to fill the new jobs that have opened in countries with
aging and waning local populations.42 Secularized Scandinavians have moved
equality and the rule of law.”).
38
See generally GOD AND THE EU: FAITH IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT (Jonathan Chaplin & Gary Wilson
eds., 2017).
39
Dieter Grimm, Conflicts Between General Laws and Religious Norms, in CONSTITUTIONAL
SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 3 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2014).
40
Id. at 3.
41
See, e.g., The Impact of Demographic Change in Europe, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
strategy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/impact-demographic-change-europe_en
(last
visited Dec. 22, 2020); EUR. UNION COMM. REGIONS, THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON EUROPEAN
REGIONS (2016), https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/The%20impact%20of%20demographic%
20change%20on%20European%20regions/Impact_demographic_change_european_regions.pdf;
EUR.
PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN EU REGIONS (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/
system/files/ged/eprs-briefing-633160-demographic-trends-eu-regions-final.pdf.
42
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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to more traditional southern European Christian countries and have rebelled
against the religious cultures and customs of their new homes.43 Evangelical
missionary churches have moved into long-closed Eastern European and former
Soviet lands, and they have been met with strong local opposition as they have
sought to establish churches, schools, and publishing houses, and to proselytize
door-to-door and on the public streets and parks.44 Anti-Semitism is again on the
rise throughout Europe, with xenophobic attacks on synagogues and on Jewish
interests both in Europe and in the Middle East.45 New émigrés from the Indian
subcontinent and the Pacific Rim have brought strong new forms of Hinduism,
Buddhism, Confucianism, and other Asian religions to European cities and
neighbourhoods.46 While Brexit and COVID-19 have put a temporary halt to
some of this religious movement, it has already produced vast new religious
pluralism in European lands and attendant conflicts that have clogged local
courts and regulators. Supranational courts, with more detached views on
religious freedom, have become more attractive to these new or newly arrived
faiths, particularly religious and cultural minorities seeking accommodations for
themselves or removals of the religious establishments around them.
Second, and related, the recent rise of Islam in Western European lands has
raised serious religious and cultural controversy in Old Europe. For more than a
decade, the EU has demurred on Turkey’s accession to the EU, in no small part
because of deep worries over the compatibility of Turkey’s majority “Islamic
values” with the “European values” of existing Member States.47 These worries
about Islam have been exacerbated by bloody terrorist attacks by Islamists in
France, Spain, Germany, England, and many other places beyond Europe; by
ongoing struggles with ISIS, the Taliban, and other extremist Islamist groups in
the Middle East and their agents abroad; and by repeated controversies over
blasphemy, polygamy, civil unrest, labor disputes, and neighborhood
segregation involving Muslim émigrés in Member States.48 And since 2015, the
43
The famous case of the crucifix in Italian public schools started when Ms. Lautsi, a Finnish mother
with secular views living in Italy, challenged the Italian practice of having the crucifix displayed in classrooms.
Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
44
See John Witte, Jr., A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 619, 620–
21 (2001).
45
Bojan Pancevski, One in Four Europeans Holds Anti-Semitic Views, Survey Shows, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-in-four-europeans-holds-anti-semitic-views-survey-shows-115743
39097.
46
How Religious Commitment Varies by Country Among People of all Ages, PEW F. (June 13, 2018),
https://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-allages/.
47
See Pin, supra note 19, at 618.
48
See GILES MERRIT, SLIPPERY SLOPE: EUROPE’S TROUBLED FUTURE 199 (2016); Susanna Mancini, The
Tempting of Europe, The Political Seduction of the Cross: A Schmittian Reading of Christianity and Islam in
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massive wave of new Islamic refugees and immigrants from war-torn nations of
the Middle East and Northern Africa to European Member States has fueled
strong new anti-immigration policies and harsh anti-Islamic rhetoric and
political movements.49
Finally, several grave scandals in various churches have put Christianity
back on its heels and back into the glaring media spotlight. Catholic churches in
Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Poland, and beyond have all
been rocked by recent media exposures, state reports, criminal indictments, and
lawsuits about decades of widespread pedophilia of delinquent priests and
cover-ups by complicit bishops—all committed under the thick veil of corporate
religious freedom.50 Protestant and Evangelicals in various lands also now face
charges of sexual and physical abuses by their clergy and other church leaders
against wives, children, parishioners, clients, and students.51 And various
churches have been called out for financial abuses and luxurious living on their
vast tax-exempt properties.52 This exposure of the underside of Christianity has
led a number of academics and politicians to question seriously the wisdom and
safety of maintaining the time-honored human rights principle of recognizing
the autonomy of religious groups, and some now call for the abolition of
religious freedom altogether.53
Together, the new debates over the ongoing roles and rights of traditional
Christian religions, the new challenges posed by the rise of Islam and new
emigrants, and the exposure of church abuses have put religion at the heart of

European Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 111–13
(Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2015); Alessandro dal Lago, Esistono davvero I conflitti tra
culture? Una riflessione storico-metodologica, in MULTICULTURALISMO: IDEOLOGIE E SFIDE 78 (Carlo Galli ed.,
2006).
49
Cathrytn Costello, Overcoming Refugee Containment and Crisis, 21 GERMAN L.J. 17, 19–20 (2020).
50
See, e.g., Nik Martin, German Catholic Church ‘Needs Urgent Reform’, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 3,
2019), https://p.dw.com/p/3Ce6m; Poland’s Catholic Church Admits Clergy Sexually Abused Hundreds of
Children, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 14, 2019), https://p.dw.com/p/3F5dV; Ralf Sotscheck, Pope Francis in
Ireland Draws Large Crowd, Protests, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 25, 2018), https://p.dw.com/p/33jbq; Vatican
Set to Issue Guidelines on Pedophile Priests, NEWS.COM (Apr. 10, 2010), https://www.news.com.au/world/
vatican-set-to-issue-guidelines-on-pedophile-priests/news-story/25c18a9da3fdb2d2024da1b11ae2f890.
51
Michael Martin, Protestant Churches Grapple With Growing Sexual Abuse Crisis, NPR (May 23, 2014,
11:33 AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/23/315129859/sex-abuse-allegations-getting-protestant-churches-tocome-clean?t=1579600456400.
52
Von Anna Catherin Loll & Peter Wensierski, The Hidden Wealth of the Catholic Church, SPIEGEL
INT’L (June 14, 2010), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/financial-scandals-the-hidden-wealth-ofthe-catholic-church-a-700513.html.
53
See Brian Morris, It’s Time for the Churches to Start Paying Tax, DAILY TEL. (May 9, 2016, 3:08 PM),
https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/rendezview/its-time-for-the-churches-to-start-paying-tx/news-story/2a96bc
23043ffbbbb0327b64f8350802.
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Europe’s political narratives and legal controversies. And it has accelerated the
pace of religious freedom litigation in both the ECtHR and the CJEU.54
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE TWO COURTS
A train will take you from Strasbourg to Luxembourg in two and a half
hours. But the real distance between the Strasbourg Court and Luxembourg
Court is much wider in legal, institutional, and cultural terms. The European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has focused on rights from the beginning,
using the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. While its jurisdiction
covers the whole of Europe and well beyond, the impact of its rulings depends
on voluntary compliance by Member States. By comparison, the Court of Justice
of the European Union in Luxembourg is territorially much smaller, but its
rulings are much more powerful. Initially, this Court focused on economic
matters. But, in the past decade with the promulgation of the 2010 Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the CJEU has also taken up
religious freedom and other fundamental rights claims, particularly when they
include labor, property, and other economic factors. Its religious freedom cases
so far have been narrow in scope, but its rulings are binding throughout the EU,
and are thus more legally consequential than the rulings of the ECtHR. Part II
summarizes these main differences.
A. The European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR, sitting in Strasbourg, has jurisdiction over the forty-seven
European countries of the Council of Europe (not just the twenty-seven countries
of the European Union), which include nearly 900 million people.55 Parties
within any of these Member States can file complaints that their State has
violated their rights as enshrined in the 1950 European Convention on Human
Rights (“ECHR” or “Convention”), including their religious freedom rights.
The most important religious freedom guarantee enforced by the ECtHR is
Article 9 of the European Convention:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public

54

OLIVIER ROY, L’EUROPA È ANCORA CRISTIANA? 11 (Michele Zurlo trans., 2019).
The European Convention on Human Rights – How Does it Work?, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.
int/en/web/impact-convention-human-rights/how-it-works (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
55
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or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.56

An important Protocol on Article 9 adds that “the State shall respect the right
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own
religious and philosophical convictions.”57 Complementing these protections,
the Convention also protects other rights and freedoms with religious
dimensions. Included are the right to one’s own private religious practices
(Article 8);58 freedom of religious and antireligious expression (Article 10);59
and freedoms of religious assembly and association (Article 11).60 The
Convention also prohibits religious and other forms of discrimination (Article
14).61
As with other international human rights instruments, the European
Convention has no formal prohibition on the establishment of religion that is
equivalent to the First Amendment’s “No Establishment Clause” in the United
States Constitution.62 The European Convention also lacks a separate, explicit
provision governing the relations of religious communities and the state.63
While the Convention’s religious freedom guarantees have always held
ample potential, they were largely dead letter for the first forty years, generating
little sturdy case law on the merits before the Kokkinakis case of 1993.64 But
56

Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, ¶¶ 1–2.
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2,
opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force May 18, 1954) [hereinafter Convention
Protocol No. 1].
58
Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
59
Id. art. 10.
60
Id. art. 11.
61
Id. art. 14.
62
See generally NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012). But see JEROEN TEMPERMAN, STATE-RELIGION
RELATIONSHIPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A RIGHT TO RELIGIOUSLY NEUTRAL GOVERNANCE 2–4
(2010) (arguing that contemporary human rights norms imply limits on state-religion identification).
63
The same is true of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Charter, supra note 13.
64
The European Court of Human Rights (and its predecessors) has found at least fifty-nine violations of
Article 9—the first in 1993 and most of them in the past decade. See COUNCIL OF EUR., OVERVIEW: 1959–2014
ECHR 1, 6–7 (2015), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_ENG.pdf (compiling court
statistics). For the early case law, see THE CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Malcolm D. Evans, Peter Petkoff & Julian Rivers eds., 2015); CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION
57

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

2021]

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

FAITH IN STRASBOURG AND LUXEMBOURG

601

since then, the ECtHR has issued judgments on the merits in some 150 cases
involving religious freedom, including almost a score of them in the form of
Grand Chamber judgments that carry ample authority.65 These cases have come
from a remarkable variety of countries—from Turkey to Ireland, from Finland
to Cyprus—with strikingly different legal regimes and a wide range of local
religion-state relations.66
Through its cases, the Strasbourg Court has developed a nuanced
jurisprudence of religious freedom. It emphasizes religion as “one of the most
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception
of life.”67 It appreciates that religious culture and pluralism are vital for “the
society as a whole.”68 Moreover, the Court has distilled the crucial aspects of
religious freedom, namely freedom to believe, to manifest one’s religion, and to
associate for religious purposes, thereby identifying the individual and the
collective components of religion.69 Despite the initial individualist focus of the
European Convention when passed in 1950, the ECtHR of late has emphasized
that:
[T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable
for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very
heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. The State’s duty of
neutrality and impartiality, as defined in the [ECtHR’s] case-law, is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs.70

The Strasbourg Court, however, has rather weak powers. Individuals usually
file claims in the Court against their home State only after exhausting all their
existing domestic remedies in their home State. Their claim is that the Member
State failed to comply with the Convention and violated their rights.71 A new
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); Carolyn Evans, Religion and Freedom of
Expression, in RELIGION & HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 188 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds.,
2012); T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights,
in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 305 (Johan D. van der Vyver &
John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
65
For a complete list of cases through 2015, see EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., GUIDE ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION 1, 70–80
(2015), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf.
66
Pin, supra note 19, at 605–06.
67
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02, ¶ 99 (June 10, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-99221.
68
Christopher McCrudden, Religion, Human Rights, Equality and the Public Sphere, 13 ECCLESIASTICAL
L.J. 26, 32 (2011).
69
Id. at 27.
70
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow, App. No. 302/02 at ¶ 99.
71
Convention, supra note 2, art. 34.
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Protocol allows the trial courts of Member States to request a preliminary
opinion from the ECtHR on the correct interpretation of a Convention right that
might be at issue.72 But not many Member States have adhered to this Protocol,
and it is hard to foresee what its impact will be.73 Almost all religious freedom
cases before the Court have gone through the entire and often lengthy appeal
process in the domestic courts before the cases are finally filed in Strasbourg.
Even if the Court finds a rights violation, the effects of its rulings are weak.
The States that are party to the European Convention have a specific obligation
to comply with the ECtHR’s rulings and to remove the reasons for the injustice
as far as it is possible. But a State’s compliance with the ECtHR’s rulings is
basically left to their good will, and many Member States ignore the Court’s
rulings with legal impunity.74 ECtHR cases are thus only soft laws that depend
upon persuasion, not command, and on a willingness of State Members to reform
their laws to protect their reputations as respectful of human rights, including
religious freedom rights.
Even as soft law, however, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has high respect both
within and beyond the Council of Europe.75 Some Member State legislatures and
courts have reformed and applied their laws in accordance with its rulings.76 And
the Court’s general principles and protections of religious freedom are often
regarded as exemplary.77 Moreover, this soft law has paved the way for the
CJEU, which has drawn extensively from the ECtHR. The CJEU has started
forging hard law on religious freedom out of the soft law in the ECtHR’s
judgments.
B. The Court of Justice of the European Union
The CJEU is the judicial organ of the European Union. Founded in the
1950s, the EU covers only some of the territory within the Council of Europe—
twenty-seven countries and an estimated 446 million people after Brexit (500
million before Brexit in 2020).78
72
Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
1, opened for signature Oct. 2, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 214 (entered into force Aug. 1, 2018).
73
Details on Treaty No. 214, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/214 (last visited Dec. 22, 2020) (showing that only ten countries have ratified the protocol).
74
Gerards, supra note 7, at 22.
75
See COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS:
THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 11 (2014) (“[T]he ECtHR has a 49 percent compliance rate, which is remarkably
high for an international tribunal.”).
76
Id. at 14.
77
Durham & Kirkham, supra note 22, at 2.
78
EU in Figures, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en (last visited
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The CJEU is composed of a General Court and a Court of Justice.79 These
two tribunals have discrete competence, with the latter functioning also as court
of appeal from the General Court’s judgments.80 Most religious freedom cases
have been decided directly by the Court of Justice, which operates through ten
Chambers and reserves for the Grand Chamber the most important cases.81 The
CJEU normally employs an Advocate General (AG), who is a member of the
CJEU, although not a judge.82 The AG typically submits a written opinion with
a detailed explanation of the case and a reasoned legal reflection of the best
interests of the EU in the case.83 The AG’s opinion often shapes the CJEU’s
judgment, whose rulings tend to be succinct and issued without dissenting or
concurring opinions.84
While the ECtHR issues soft law that depends on voluntary compliance by
individual Member States of the Council of Europe, the CJEU issues hard law
that is automatically binding in all EU states. Its judgments override domestic
legislation and are immediately applicable by domestic judges. The CJEU spells
out EU policy and mandates, with local enforcement of EU law done by the
Member States themselves.
The CJEU operates primarily through the “preliminary procedure.”85 When
a domestic judge is confronted with a controversy that involves interpretation of
applicable EU law, the judge requests the CJEU to issue a ruling to dispel the
interpretive doubt. Once the ruling is issued, the domestic judge resumes the
local proceeding and adjudicates according to the CJEU’s direction.86 When
directed, the domestic judge applies EU law instead of domestic law.87 This
“preliminary procedure” thus leaves the Member States’ compliance with EU
law both to the CJEU and domestic judges. By enforcing EU law, even at the

Dec. 22, 2020).
79
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en#composition (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
80
Id.
81
Court of Justice: Composition of Chambers, CT. JUST. EUR. UNION, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/
Jo2_7029/en/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
82
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, art. 49 (May 1, 2019), https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-08/tra-doc-en-div-c-0000-2016-201606984-05_00.pdf.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Giulio Itzcovich, The European Court of Justice, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING 277,
278 (András Jakab, Arthur Dyevre & Giulio Itzcovich eds., 2017); see Preliminary Ruling Proceedings —
Recommendations to National Courts, EUR-LEX (Oct. 31, 2017), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=uriserv:l14552.
86
PAUL P. CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW 382 (5th ed. 2011).
87
Id. at 362.
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expense of domestic legislation, local domestic judges act in effect as EU judges,
amplifying the effect and effectiveness of the CJEU.88
Fundamental rights protection was initially not part of the CJEU’s mission.
The European Union was born out of the European Community of Carbon and
Steel, the European Economic Community, and the European Agency for
Atomic Energy, all vital cooperative arrangements created in the aftermath of
World War II. The CJEU was accordingly focused on cultivating the cooperation
of these and other European communities and fostering economic freedoms and
equal opportunities in a free and unified European market.89
In the 1990s, however, the EU took on the language and the narrative of
rights more directly. In 2000, it adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union, and in 2010 incorporated it into the EU Treaty and synced
it with the earlier European Convention enforced by the ECtHR: “Fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of
the Union's law.”90 Accordingly the new EU Charter tracks many of the rights
provisions of the Convention, including those on religious freedom.
Article 10 of the Charter echoes Article 9 of the Convention, while adding
an express conscientious objection clause:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in
private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice
and observance.
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance
with the national laws governing the exercise of this right.91

Similarly, in Article 14, the Charter protects the freedom of education,
including “the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their
children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical
convictions.”92 Article 21 issues a sweeping prohibition on discrimination,

88
Anthony Arnull, Judicial Dialogue in the European Union, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 118–19 (J. Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).
89
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 17.
90
Id. at 19.
91
Charter, supra note 13, art. 10.
92
Id. art. 14.
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including religious discrimination.93 Finally, Article 22 proclaims that “[t]he
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”94 Several
important decided or pending CJEU cases are based on further EU laws that
protect religious freedom. A 2000 EU Directive, for example, prohibits “direct”
and “indirect” religious discrimination in the workplace.95
The CJEU has explicitly worked to integrate the religious freedom
protections of the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights with the newer
2010 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as EU legislation.96 In so doing,
the Court has often started with relevant ECtHR case law, picking up where the
ECtHR left off and then casting its rulings in the hard law terms with which it
operates. If this pattern continues, the CJEU will play an increasingly vital role
in integrating religious freedom protections and shaping religion-state relations
in Europe, at least in the areas where religion intersects with economic freedom,
labor relations, and social welfare, which are the Court’s primary focus.
III. THE CASES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE TWO COURTS
The ECtHR has touched on Article 9 in nearly 950 cases, and some 150 of
these cases have involved judgments on the merits of religious freedom.97 While
this Court has weak enforcement mechanisms that depend on voluntary
compliance by Member States, these cases have set out important religious
freedom principles and precepts that have helped shape European legal culture
as well as the constitutional laws of some Member States of the Council of
Europe. By contrast, the CJEU entered the religious freedom field decisively
only in 2017, but it has already issued a dozen cases on religious freedom.98
93

Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 22.
95
Council Directive 2000/78, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 16 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive
2000/78].
96
Philippa Watson & Peter Oliver, Is the Court of Justice of the European Union Finding Its Religion?,
42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 847, 850–51 (2019).
97
HUDOC
DATABASE,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“article”:[“9”,”9+P1-2”,”9-1”,”9-2”],”
documentcollectionid2”:[“GRANDCHAMBER”,”CHAMBER”]} (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
98
Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 WL CELEX 62015CJ0157 (Mar. 14, 2017);
Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017 WL CELEX 62015CJ0188 (Mar. 14, 2017); Case C-414/16,
Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwickiung eV, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0414 (Apr.
17, 2018); Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0068 (Sept. 11, 2018); Case C-25/17,
Tietosuojavaltuutettu, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0025 (July 10, 2018); Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation
GmbH v. Achatzi, 2019 WL CELEX 62017CJ0193 (Jan. 22, 2019); Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas
Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de Getafe, 2017 WL CELEX 62016CJ0074 (June 27, 2017); Case C497/17, Œuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs v. Ministre de L’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, 2019 WL
CELEX No. 62017CJ0497 (Feb. 26, 2019); Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties
Provincie Antwerpen VZW v. Gewest, 2018 WL CELEX No. 62016CJ0426 (May 29, 2018); Case C-56/17,
94
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While the issues addressed in these cases have been quite narrow and the
decisions have been based more on EU statutes than on EU Charter rights, these
CJEU cases are influential because they are automatically binding law on all
Member States of the EU.
What follows is an analysis of the two Courts’ case law in the field, arranged
under the major principles of religious freedom set out principally in the
identical language of Article 9 of the Convention and Article 10 of the Charter:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”99 Article 9 adds a clear
limitations clause, absent from Article 10:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.100

After working through the clusters of major cases in this Part, we distill the
main principles of religious freedom on offer in both these pan-European courts,
and the emerging tensions between them. Our main findings are: (1) freedom of
religion, freedom from religion, and freedom to manifest one’s religion are now
safely within the radar of the Strasbourg Court and of the Luxembourg Court;
(2) such rights inhere in all human beings, no matter their citizenship or any
other legal status; and (3) religious organizations are also protected under the
European Convention and EU law. On the other hand, (4) religious freedom is
not necessarily privileged above any other fundamental rights—it can and must
be balanced with other competing rights and interests; (5) the inner life and
working of religious organizations tends to be more heavily scrutinized by the
CJEU than the ECtHR; (6) religious freedom claims tend to lose when the
ECtHR grants a “margin of appreciation” to Member States and the CJEU calls
for religious “neutrality”; and (7) those losses have fallen disproportionately of
late on newly arrived Muslims and traditional Christians.

Bahtiyar Fathi v. Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite, 2018 WL CELEX No. 62017CJ0056 (Oct.
4, 2018).
99
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, ¶ 1; Charter, supra note 13, art. 10.
100
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, ¶ 2.
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A. Rights of Thought, Conscience, and Belief
Article 9 of the European Convention protects not just “religion” but also
“thought,” “conscience,” and “belief.”101 Like other national and international
tribunals, the ECtHR has used this more expansive language to provide
“religious freedom” protections to theists and nontheists, atheists and agnostics,
free thinkers and skeptics, new religions and ancient traditions alike.102 The
ECtHR has placed a high premium on religious “pluralism” as a fundamental
good for democratic societies, and insisted that conflicts between religions, or
between religion and nonreligion, be resolved in a way that tolerates all
peaceable forms of religion and belief in the community. As the Court put it in
2007: “[T]he role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing
groups tolerate each other. This State role is conducive to public order, religious
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society.”103 In a 2013 case, the ECtHR
stressed further “the positive obligation on the State authorities to secure the
rights under Article 9,” even when they are being violated by another private
party rather than by the State.104
Article 9 further protects a person’s right both to hold religious beliefs in
private and to manifest those beliefs peaceably in public. The ECtHR has treated
the “internal right to believe” much like European and North American national
courts have treated the liberty of conscience.105 Several ECtHR cases have made
clear that this includes each person’s right to accept, reject, or change his or her
thoughts, beliefs, or religious affiliation without involvement, inducement, or
impediment of the state.106 It protects a person from pressure to reveal his or her
religious identity or beliefs to the state.107 It protects military personnel from

101
See also The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (providing similar protections); Convention, supra note 2, art.
9, ¶ 1.
102
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
103
Members of the Gldani Congregation v. Georgia, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 132 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-80395 (citing Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267; Serif v. Greece,
1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 73); see also Kuznetsov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-78982 (finding an Article 9 violation for a state’s failure to prosecute officials who had illegally
broken up a Jehovah’s Witness Sunday worship service).
104
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215, 254, ¶ 84.
105
See EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AROUND THE WORLD: BRIEFING
(2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642277/EPRS_BRI(2019)642277_EN.pdf.
106
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶¶ 56, 74 (1993).
107
Işik v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 356, ¶ 41. But see Wasmuth v. Germany, App. No. 12884/03,
¶¶ 50–51 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103536.
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being forced to discuss religion with their superior officers.108 It protects persons
from being forced to swear a religious oath in order to take political office, to
testify in court, or to receive a state benefit or professional license.109 As the
ECtHR put it in 2010: “State authorities are not entitled to intervene in the sphere
of an individual’s freedom of conscience and to seek to discover his or her
religious beliefs or oblige him or her to disclose such beliefs.”110
1. Conscientious Objection and the Military
Many European countries now use their own constitutional guarantees of
“liberty of conscience” and the “internal right to believe” as grounds for granting
pacifists exemption from compulsory military service.111 An explicit right to
conscientious objection was not included in Article 9 of the 1950 Convention,
nor was it included in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose
religious freedom guarantee was largely echoed in the Convention.
Conscientious objection to military service was a vexed human rights topic in
the immediate aftermath of the two world wars, and it only gradually came to be
recognized by individual states.112 The European Convention itself, while
prohibiting forced labor in general in Article 4, made clear that this provision
did not include “any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious
objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of
compulsory military service.”113 It was only in 1993 that the United Nations
Human Rights Committee first declared to the human rights world that “the
obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.”114 The Committee
urged all nation states worldwide to recognize this right “by law or practice,”
ensuring “there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the
basis of the nature of their particular beliefs [and] . . . no discrimination against
conscientious objectors because they have failed to perform military service.”115
108

Larissis v. Greece, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 329, 362.
Alexandridis v. Greece, App. No. 19516/06, ¶¶ 38, 41 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00185189; Buscarini v. San Marino, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, 616–18, ¶¶ 36, 39–40.
110
Işik, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 356, ¶ 41; see also Dimitras v. Greece, App. Nos. 42837/06, 3269/07,
35793/07 & 6099/08, ¶¶ 46, 64 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99014.
111
Brief for Amnesty International Supporting the Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service
as Amici Curiae, Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2014Hun-Ga8, 2013Hun-Ga5, 13, 23, 27 & 2012Hun-Ga17
(S. Kor.), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/pol310012014en.pdf.
112
Dorothy Estrada Tanck, Civil Resistance in Public International Law, 35 ANUARIO ESPANOL DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 373, 373–77 (2019).
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Accordingly, in 2010, the European Union included an explicit right to
conscientious objection in Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.116
It was only with Bayatyan v. Armenia (2011)117 that the ECtHR read this
right into Article 9 of the European Convention. In that case, the Court granted
relief to a Jehovah’s Witness who was imprisoned for failing to serve in the
military upon his conscription; noncombat options were unavailable at the time.
“Article 9 did not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection,” the
ECtHR noted, ignoring Article 4’s explicit denial of this right.118 The ECtHR,
however, found that “a serious and insurmountable conflict between the
obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or deeply and
genuinely held religious or other belief constituted a conviction or belief of
sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance to attract the
guarantees of Article 9.”119 It helped the Bayatyan Court that “the overwhelming
majority” of European state legislatures by that time had already granted
conscientious objection status to pacifists, thereby generating a consensus
among the Member States.120 In the absence of a legislative accommodation by
a Member State, Article 9 protects the rights of pacifism, the ECtHR ruled.121
The Court ruled similarly in a more recent Jehovah’s Witness case in
Papavasilakis v. Greece (2016).122 There, a man invoked his upbringing as a
Jehovah’s Witness as grounds for his conscientious objection to military
service.123 Even though he no longer identified as a Witness, he still believed in
pacifism.124 The ECtHR held that since Greece had not properly adjudicated this
claim to conscientious objection, it had violated his Article 9 rights.125
In more recent cases, however, the ECtHR has made clear that Article 9
protects conscientious objectors only if their objections are rooted in religious
beliefs that are in serious and insurmountable conflict with state obligations to
perform military service. In Enver Aydemir v. Turkey (2016),126 the Court
116

Charter, supra note 13, art. 10, ¶ 2.
Bayatyan v. Armenia, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
118
Id. at 4.
119
Id.
120
See Compilation of Gen. Comments and Gen. Recommendations Adopted by Hum. Rts. Treaty Bodies,
Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 1, 38, ¶ 11 (1994).
121
Bayatyan, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.
122
Papavasilakis v. Greece, App. No. 66899/14 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001166850.
123
Id. ¶ 8–9.
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Id. ¶ 11.
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Id. ¶ 50.
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Aydemir v. Turkey, App. No. 26012/11 (July 9, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163940.
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rejected the claim of a man who declared himself a conscientious objector and
refused to perform his military service for the Turkish secularist government,
though he said he would be willing to serve in the military if the Turkish
government was Islamic.127 The ECtHR judged the man’s objection to be
political, not religious, in inspiration and thus not deserving of Article 9
protection.128
2. Conscientious Objection in the Workplace
The ECtHR dealt with conscientious objection in the field of noncompulsory work with the signature case of Eweida and Others v. The United
Kingdom (2013).129 This ruling involved claims by four different employees
who sought accommodation for their religious beliefs and their manifestation in
practice.130 Two of these employees raised freedom of conscience claims against
private and state employers who insisted they work with same-sex parties.131 In
one case, Gary McFarlane worked as a consultant for a national private
organization that provided sex therapy.132 “Directly motivated by his orthodox
Christian beliefs about marriage and sexual relationships,” he believed that
same-sex relations were sinful, and he therefore refused to provide his therapy
services to same-sex couples.133 The organization dismissed him, alleging that
he had failed to comply with its code of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.134 McFarlane lost his domestic claim that he had been discriminated
against on religious grounds,135 and he thus sued in the Strasbourg Court under
Article 9 and 14 of the Convention. The ECtHR ruled against McFarlane.136 The
Court did not deny that he suffered infringement of his Article 9 religious
freedom, but found that, given his employer’s explicit policy of
nondiscrimination “in securing the rights” of same-sex parties and all others, the
State had an ample margin of appreciation to strike a balance in favor of his
employer.137

No. 49972/16 (Mar. 10, 2020). An appeal before the Grand Chamber is pending at the moment.
127
Aydemir, App. No. 26012/11 ¶ 79–80.
128
Id. ¶ 83.
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Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215, 223 ¶ 3.
130
Id.
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Id. at 229–36.
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Id. at 232.
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Id. at 261.
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Id. at 232–36.
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Id. at 235–36.
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Id. at 262.
137
Id. at 261–62.
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The better-known claimant in the Eweida case was Lilian Ladele. She was
an employee in a London borough’s registrar office.138 She also held the
“orthodox Christian view that marriage is the union of one man and one woman
for life. She believed that same-sex unions are contrary to God’s will and that it
would be wrong for her to participate in the creation of an institution equivalent
to marriage between a same-sex couple.”139 Part of her job consisted in
registering partnerships for the state. When the State introduced a same-sex
domestic partnership option, she found that her Christian faith prevented her
from participating in the establishment of such partnerships.140 For a time, she
sought and found a practical accommodation with her co-workers, who allowed
her to avoid registering same-sex partnerships and to focus on other activities.141
After her colleagues stopped covering for her, Ladele requested a formal
accommodation from her employer, who refused.142 She sued and lost in English
courts for religious discrimination and violation of her conscience and beliefs.143
After exhausting her domestic appeals, she took her case to Strasbourg, arguing
that her employer’s failure to accord her a conscientious objection constituted
religious discrimination under Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention.144
The ECtHR now rejected as untenable its earlier position that there was no
Article 9 violation if the applicant had a way to “circumvent a limitation placed
on his or her freedom to manifest religion or belief.”145 Such an approach had
been criticized for allowing employers to refuse accommodations to their
employees’ religious needs.146 Rather than “holding that the possibility of
changing jobs would negate any interference with the right,” the Court reasoned,
“the better approach” was “to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when
considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate.”147 On Ms.
Ladele’s side of the balance, the Court recognized that this new policy of
registering same-sex partnerships had “a particularly detrimental impact on her
because of her religious beliefs.”148 She was fired from a job that she had taken
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Id. at 259.
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Id. at 230–31.
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Id. at 232.
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John Finnis, Equality and Religious Liberty: Oppressing Conscientious Diversity, in RELIGIOUS
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when there was no conflict between those beliefs and her job responsibilities.149
On the other hand, the Court noted that “the local authority’s policy aimed to
secure the rights of others,”150 including same-sex parties. In balancing these
conflicting rights, the Court concluded that the State deserved an ample margin
of appreciation and could fire Ms. Ladele with impunity.151 The upshot of these
twin Eweida cases is that religious conscience or belief can be protected, but
only if its expression or manifestation threatened or caused no harm to others.
Squaring religious freedom claims with same-sex rights and liberties has
been a difficult exercise for European states and other countries, and it is likely
to remain so. The Old Continent itself is split between liberal Western and more
traditional Central and Eastern European perspectives on same-sex matters. The
Netherlands was the first country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage in
2001.152 Northern Ireland was the latest to do so in mid-2019.153 The main
holdout in Western Europe is Italy, which introduced only a civil partnership
option for same-sex couples in 2016.154 Most Central and Eastern European
countries, by contrast, make no legal provision for same-sex marriage, and a
number of them are actively opposed to same-sex unions of any sort.155
Accommodating the wide array of opinions on same-sex relations and their
compatibility with countervailing religious freedom and liberty of conscience
claims will be a formidable challenge for the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Courts in the years ahead.
3. Religion and Education, Students and Parents
The ECtHR has also repeatedly addressed claims by students and parents
seeking freedom from religious coercion in schools in violation of their
“thought, conscience, and belief.” These cases have decidedly mixed results. In
an early case of Valsamis v. Greece (1996), the ECtHR provided no relief to a
Jehovah’s Witness student who was punished for not participating in a school
parade celebrating a national holiday in commemoration of Greece’s war with
Italy.156 The student had claimed conscientious objection to participation in this
149

Id. at 260.
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Id. at 254, 260.
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celebration of warfare.157 The school had already accommodated his
conscientious objections to religious-education classes and to participation in
the school’s Orthodox mass, but the school did not think he warranted an
exemption from the parade.158 The ECtHR agreed. Participation in a one-time
parade, far removed from the field of military battle, the Court concluded, did
not “offend the applicants’ pacifist convictions” enough to warrant an
exemption.159
In Konrad and Others v. Germany (2006), the ECtHR rejected the rights
claim of parents to homeschool their primary-school-aged children.160 The
Romeikes were conservative Christians who opposed the German public
school’s liberal sex education courses, its use of fairy tales with magic and
witchcraft, and its tolerance of physical and psychological violence among
students.161 In the absence of available private schools, they wanted to teach their
young children at home at their own expense, using the same curriculum as stateapproved private schools, but with supplemental religious instruction.162
Germany denied their request, citing its constitutionally based system of
mandatory school attendance.163 The parents appealed, on behalf of themselves
and their children. They claimed violations of their rights to privacy, equality,
and religious freedom under the Convention.164 They also pointed to the Protocol
to Article 9 that explicitly identifies “the right of parents to ensure such
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.”165
The ECtHR ruled for Germany.166 The Protocol to Article 9, the Court
pointed out, begins by saying that “[n]o person shall be denied the right of
education.”167 “It is on to this fundamental right that is grafted the right of
parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions.”168 The
child’s right to education came first, and the Romeike children were too young
157

Id.
Id. at 2323.
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to waive that right or to understand the implications of that waiver for their later
democratic capacities.169 Germany’s interest and duty was in protecting each
child’s right to education and “safeguarding pluralism in education, which is
essential for the preservation of the ‘democratic society’ . . . . In view of the
power of the modern State, it is above all through State teaching that this aim
must be realized.”170 Germany has determined that in a democratic society “not
only the acquisition of knowledge but also integration into and first experiences
of society are important goals in primary-school education. . . . [T]hose
objectives could not be met to the same extent by home education, even if it
allowed children to acquire the same standard of knowledge.”171 Moreover, the
parents could provide their children with the religious instruction they desire
outside of school time.172 With no European consensus on homeschooling
options, the ECtHR concluded, Germany must enjoy a “margin of appreciation”
in how best to educate its citizens.173
The German police thereafter forcibly transported the Romeike children to
the public school, and their parents faced fines and potential loss of custody. In
response, the family moved to the United States, which has long allowed
homeschooling in many of its states.174 The U.S. immigration court granted them
asylum, holding that the German policy against homeschooling was “utterly
repellant to everything we believe in as Americans.”175 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed, and the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Romeike appeal.176 The family thus faced
deportation, but the Department of Homeland Security decided to give their case
“indefinite deferred action status.”177 Congress now has under consideration the
Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act to provide relief in such cases.178
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The ECtHR was more sympathetic to the claims of atheist and agnostic
students and their parents who claimed religious coercion in the cases of Folgerø
and Others v. Norway (2007) and Grzelak v. Poland (2010). Folgerø addressed
a new Norwegian law requiring all public grade school and middle school
students to take a course in “Christianity, Religion and Philosophy” (“KRL”).179
The law made no exceptions for non-Christian students.180 Four students, whose
families were professed humanists, objected that this policy forced them into
religious instruction they could not abide.181 The ECtHR agreed. It found that
the State had not tailored its new law carefully enough to deal with students with
different religious and nonreligious backgrounds.182 “[N]otwithstanding the
many laudable legislative purposes” in introducing this course, the ECtHR held,
the material was not “conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic
manner.”183 Moreover, the school’s “refusal to grant the applicant parents full
exemption from the KRL subject for their children gave rise to a violation” of
the parents’ rights to raise their child in their own faith, in this case atheism.184
Three years later, in Grzelak, a public grade school student in Poland, with
agnostic parents, was properly exempted from mandatory religion classes in
public school, as the Folgerø ruling had demanded.185 But his only alternative
to attending the religion classes was to spend unsupervised time in the school
hallway, library, or club. His parents wanted him enrolled in an alternative
course in secular ethics.186 The school refused to offer such a special course for
lack of enough teachers, students, and funds.187 The school further marked his
report card with a blank for “religion/ethics,” and calculated his cumulative
grade point average based on fewer credit hours.188 The ECtHR found that these
state actions violated both Articles 9 and 14 (prohibiting religious
discrimination) of the Convention, for “[it] brings about a situation in which
individuals are obliged—directly or indirectly—to reveal that they are nonbelievers.”189
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In Lautsi v. Italy (2011), however, the ECtHR upheld Italy’s longstanding
policy of displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms despite religious
freedom objections.190 In this case, an atheist mother of two public school
children challenged Italy’s policy as a form of coercion of Christian beliefs.191
She argued that the presence of these crucifixes in public schools violated her
and her children’s rights to religious freedom and to a secular education
guaranteed by Article 9 and its Protocol, and other provisions.192 The ECtHR’s
Grand Chamber held in favor of Italy.193 It recognized that the crucifix is a
religious symbol, that atheism is a protected religious belief, and that public
schools must be religiously neutral and free from religious coercion.194 But the
ECtHR held that the passive display of a crucifix in a public school classroom
by itself was not a form of religious coercion—particularly when students of all
faiths were welcome in public schools and were free to wear their own religious
symbols.195 The ECtHR held further that Italy’s policy of displaying only the
crucifix and no other religious symbol was not a violation of its obligation of
religious neutrality, but an acceptable reflection of its majoritarian Catholic
culture and history.196 As Judge Bonello put it in his concurrence: “A court of
human rights cannot allow itself to suffer from historical Alzheimer’s. It has no
right to disregard the cultural continuum of a nation’s flow through time, nor to
ignore what, over the centuries, has served to mold and define the profile of a
people.”197 With European nations widely divided on whether and where to
display various religious symbols, the ECtHR concluded, Italy must be granted
a “margin of appreciation” to decide for itself how and where to maintain its
traditions in school.198
4. Coercion and Religious Worship of Prisoners
The ECtHR has further made clear that a prisoner, though more limited in
rights than a soldier or student, still has a right to be free from religious coercion
and a basic right to peaceable religious worship without recrimination or
190
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punishment.199 The Court reiterated this longstanding position in the Grand
Chamber case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia (2016), holding
that prison authorities who had, for no stated reason, refused to allow a pastor
and parents to visit a prisoner violated the Article 9 rights of the prisoner to
exercise his faith in “community with others.”200
The Court held similarly in Korostelev v. Russia (2020),201 in protecting
Korostelev, a Muslim held in a Russian penitentiary in solitary confinement.
Prison officials subjected him to repeated reprimands for getting up from his bed
to pray at night during the holy month of Ramadan. That conduct, officials
argued, breached prison rules that required that detainees remain in their beds at
night. The Russian government later argued that detainees had not only the right,
but a duty to sleep at night.202 The Court, however, found that Russia had
violated Mr. Korostelev’s freedom of conscience and worship under Article 9,
as the limitation and reprimands that he suffered were not “necessary in a
democratic society,” as the Article requires.203
Not all such restrictions on prisoners, however, constitute coercion. In
Süveges v. Hungary (2016),204 for example, the ECtHR held that the authorities’
refusal to allow a person under house arrest to attend a weekly worship service
outside his home was not a violation of Article 9.205 In this case, the ECtHR
concluded, the restriction was prescribed by law, pursued a stated legitimate
purpose of safety and security, was proportionate to that purpose, and was
necessary in a democratic society.206 After all, this claimant could still worship
in his home with co-religionists and religious leaders coming to him, as they do
with others who are shut-in because of injury, infirmity, or other limits on their
movement. Here, the balance between state interests and private rights tipped in
favor of the State.207
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5. Religious Freedom for Refugees
The ECtHR has issued most of the cases alleging violations of thought,
conscience, and belief based on Article 9 of the Convention. Recently, however,
the CJEU has weighed in on cases dealing with claims of religious refugees to
coercion and real or threatened persecution in their home countries. These
parties have sought protection both under applicable EU law and Article 10
Charter rights, and the CJEU has weighed in on these cases, drawing in part on
ECtHR cases.
The 2012 CJEU case of Y and Z208 turned on the interpretation of two articles
of an EU Directive that set standards for the qualification and status of third
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees.209 Y and Z were the
pseudonyms of two Ahmadi worshippers who had fled Pakistan seeking refuge
in Germany, where they submitted asylum applications.210 Local German
officials denied their requests.211 The Ahmadis sued under an EU Directive that
defined a refugee as “a third country national who, owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of . . . religion is outside the country of
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or
herself to the protection of that country.”212 The Advocate General’s (AG)
opinion for the CJEU was expansive in articulating the proper grounds and limits
of such refugee claims.213 The AG thought it essential that officials differentiate
cases where a refugee applicant “migrates for personal reasons or to improve his
living conditions or social status,” from cases “where the individual suffers from
a restriction of such severity as to deprive him of his most essential rights and
he cannot avail himself of the protection of his country of origin.”214 In the AG’s
view, it was inadmissible to deny asylum or refugee status to applicants who
could avoid persecution by renouncing their religious practices, for that violated
the most essential rights of conscience.215 Under EU law, Y and Z could not be
expected to conceal their religious identities in order to avoid persecution:

208

Joined Cases C-71 & 91/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y, Z, CELEX No. 62011CJ0071 (Sept. 5,

2012).
209
Id. ¶¶ 80, 81; see Council Directive 2004/83 of Apr. 29, 2004 on Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, arts. 2(c), 9(1)(a), 2004 O.J.
(L 304) 12, 14, 16 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2004/83].
210
Y, Z, CELEX No. 62011CJ0071 ¶¶ 30–32.
211
Id. ¶ 32.
212
Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 209, at art. 2(c). 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC).
213
Y, Z, CELEX No. 62011CC0071 ¶¶ 33–69 (Apr. 19, 2012).
214
Id. ¶ 29.
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Id. ¶ 106.
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In Pakistan, where Sunni Islam is the State religion and its followers
represent the majority of the population, the Ahmadiyya community
constitutes a religious minority, whose members are considered
heretics. The law on blasphemy has strengthened . . . the Pakistan
Penal Code by introducing the death penalty and the penalty of
imprisonment for any individual who . . . insults the sacred name of
the prophet Muhammad or the symbols and places associated with
Islam. In addition, [the code makes] an offence punishable . . . for any
individual member of the Ahmadiyya community who [among other
things] professes his faith in public, or identifies it with Islam . . . or in
any other way outrages Islam.216

The CJEU agreed. While not every “interference with the right to religious
freedom guaranteed by Article 10(1) of the Charter constitutes an act of
persecution requiring the competent authorities to grant refugee status,”217 the
CJEU argued, EU law protects both public and private expressions of religion.218
Prohibitions on public worship and threats of repression and punishment for
those who do not follow the state’s established religion can constitute
persecution under EU law so long as they pose concrete, not theoretical, threats
to an individual,219 and so long as a public religious practice is of particular
salience for the individual seeking refuge.220
In Bahtiyar Fathi (2018),221 the CJEU further clarified how EU States should
assess the claims of religious persecution of refugee applicants, now interpreting
a new EU Directive.222 Fathi was an Iranian Kurd, who applied for refugee
protection while living in Bulgaria.223 He did not identify as a member of a
traditional religious community, nor did he submit evidence of his religious
practice.224 He identified himself simply as a “normal Christian with Protestant
leanings.”225 He said he had been questioned and detained by Iranian officials
for watching and calling into a program playing on a Christian channel that

216

Id. ¶ 80.
Y, Z, CELEX No. 62011CJ0071, ¶ 58 (Sept. 5, 2012).
218
Id. ¶¶ 62–63.
219
Id. ¶ 69.
220
Id. ¶ 70.
221
Case C-56/17, Bahtiyar Fathi v. Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite, CELEX No.
62017CJ0056 (Oct. 4, 2018).
222
Id. ¶¶ 99–101; see Directive 2011/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 13, 2011
on Standards For the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of
International Protection, For a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection,
and for the Content of the Protection Ranted, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 16 (EU).
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Fathi, CELEX No. 62017CJ0056 ¶ 30.
224
Id. ¶ 73.
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Iranian law prohibited.226 During his detention, he confessed his Christian
faith.227 Bulgarian authorities found his story of persecution “implausible,” and
they rejected his refugee application.228 Fathi sued in a Bulgarian court, who
then requested the CJEU to issue a preliminary ruling on: (1) what type of
persecution triggered the right to refugee status, (2) how broad was the
protection of religious belief accorded by EU laws, and (3) how should states
judge the veracity of the asylum seeker’s claim.229
First, the CJEU stated that the penalties that a convert would face in case of
return to his home country had to be “applied in practice”230 or consist of a real
threat.231 Second, the concept of “religion” in the EU Directive protecting
refugees included public and private expressions of religion, “theistic, nontheistic and atheistic beliefs,”232 and “both ‘traditional’ religions and other
beliefs.”233 It covered “participation in” those various forms of religion “either
alone or in community with others, or the abstention from, formal worship,
which implie[d] that the fact that a person [wa]s not a member of a religious
community [could not], in itself, be decisive in the assessment of that
concept.”234 Third, the claimant had to “duly substantiate his claims as to his
alleged religious conversion,” going beyond mere “statements and no more
relating to his religion beliefs or membership of a religious community.”235 The
claimant had also to provide “coherent and plausible” statements, without
running “counter to available specific and general information relevant to [the]
case.”236 Overall, the claimant himself had to be credible.237 The Fathi Court
urged domestic authorities not to take too a narrow approach to the evidence
provided by a claimant.238 They were expected to consider the applicant’s claim
in concreto. They had to consider a variety of aspects of the claimant’s faith,
including his:
religious beliefs and how he developed such beliefs, how he
understands and lives his faith or atheism, its connection with the
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
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doctrinal, ritual or prescriptive aspects of the religion to which he
states he is affiliated or from which he intends to distance himself, his
possible role in the transmission of his faith or even a combination of
religious factors and factors regarding identity, ethnicity or gender.239

This pair of cases provides a good framework to understand what the state
and the refugee applicant owe each other according to EU law. The claimant
must substantiate the claim that she has been or may be persecuted in her country
of origin. The state, in turn, must thoroughly consider what it is about the
religious belief, practice, or personality of the claimant that has or might trigger
religious persecution. Without entering religious disputes, this approach tries to
give a comprehensive reading of what can be considered religious persecution,
while shortening the list of discriminatory practices that amount to persecution.
The close attention paid by the CJEU to the ECtHR’s case law in setting its
Directive shows the extent to which pan-European jurisdictions are trying to
secure their borders while providing shelter to persecuted people from third
countries.
B. Regulation of the Public Manifestations of Religion
Article 9 of the European Convention protects not only the internal right to
believe or change belief without coercion, conditions, or control by the state, but
also the external right to manifest one’s beliefs in public through worship,
teaching, practice, and observance.240 The freedoms of expression in Article 10
and of association in Article 11 offer complementary protections.241 Article 9
further makes clear that the right to “manifest one’s religion [in public]” is
subject to regulation “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”242 When a party claims interference with, violation of, or a burden on
Article 9 and related rights, the Court will assess (1) whether there is, in fact,
interference with that right; (2) whether this interference was based on law,
rather than an arbitrary judgment; and (3) whether it was necessary in a
democratic society. This last point is judged by whether the law (a) corresponds
to a pressing social need; (b) is proportionate to the aim pursued; and (c) is
justified by relevant, sufficient, or pressing reasons.243
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Convention, supra note 2, art. 9 ¶ 2.
Id. art. 10, 11.
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Article 10 of the European Charter has an identical guarantee of the right “to
manifest religion or belief” but includes no explicit statement on the limitations
to this right. But in practice, the CJEU uses the three-pronged proportionality
test, which is a staple of adjudication in Continental Europe,244 to judge all such
rights claims: (1) whether a policy under scrutiny is appropriate for achieving a
certain goal; (2) whether it is necessary for its achievement; and (3) whether it
is commensurate to its purpose.
1. Proselytism and Its Legal Limits
In its earliest Article 9 case on point, Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), the
ECtHR upheld a person’s right to share his faith, despite a Greek criminal law
that prohibited proselytism.245 A Jehovah’s Witness, peaceably discussing his
faith with a local Orthodox woman, was arrested and convicted under this
statute.246 He appealed, and the ECtHR found in his favor. Article 9, the Court
reasoned, explicitly protects “freedom to manifest one’s religion . . . in
community with others” through “words and deeds” that express one’s
“religious convictions.”247 It protects “the right to try to convince one’s
neighbour, for example through ‘teaching.’”248 If that were not the case, Article
9’s “‘freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief’ . . . would be likely to remain
a dead letter.”249 The State may regulate this missionary activity for the sake of
security and protection of the rights of others. It may also outlaw “activities
offering material or social advantages with a view to gaining new members for
a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or in need; [or] the
use of violence or brainwashing.”250 These factors, however, were not present in
Kokkinakis, so he prevailed.251
By contrast, in Larissis v. Greece five years later, the ECtHR found no
violation of the Article 9 rights of military officers who were convicted for
proselytizing their military subordinates.252 The officers were Pentecostal
Christians; their subordinates were Greek Orthodox.253 The officers repeatedly

244
ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING & CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE & GLOBAL APPROACH 166, 175 (2019).
245
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
246
Id. at 3.
247
Id. at 13.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 17, ¶ 48.
251
Id. at 17, ¶ 49.
252
Larissis v. Greece, App. No. 23372/94 (Feb. 24, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58139.
253
Id. ¶ 7.
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engaged these soldiers in theological discussions while on duty, sent and read
them sundry biblical and religious texts, and invited them repeatedly to visit or
join the Pentecostal church, which one of the soldiers eventually accepted to the
dismay of his family.254 The officers were convicted of the crime of proselytism,
defined by Greek law as “any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious
beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos) with the aim
of undermining those beliefs.”255 The officers were given brief prison sentences,
later commuted to fines so long as they desisted from such behavior in the
future.256 The officers claimed violations, inter alia, of their Article 9 rights.257
The Court held for Greece.258 It noted that the military’s “hierarchical
structures . . . colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel,
making it difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of
superior rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him.”259 What
might seem like “an innocuous exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to
accept or reject,” in civilian life, might in the military be “a form of harassment
or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power.”260 The Court further
noted that, in this case, the light punishments imposed on the officers were
“more preventative than punitive in nature,” making Greece’s law a
proportionate and justified burden on the religious freedom rights of the
officers.261
Larissis was an unusual case of military officers exploiting their superiority
to proselytize their minority faith among their subordinates, who belonged to the
faith of the majority. But the problem of proselytism is much wider in Europe,
encompassing also peer-to-peer relationships. It has remained a perennial issue
particularly in Orthodox lands that prohibit evangelization of any who have been
baptized as Orthodox; in Muslim communities that regard conversion out of
Islam as a (capital) crime of apostasy; and in former Soviet bloc lands
unaccustomed to competing with Western missionaries in an open “marketplace
of religious ideas.”262 The ECtHR and European national courts have continued
to allow for general time, place, and manner restrictions on all proselytizers that
are necessary, proportionate, and applied without discrimination against any
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religion.263 But categorical criminal bans on all missionary activity, prosecution,
retention, and detention for preaching,264 or patently discriminatory licensing or
registration provisions on proselytizing faiths remain violations of the religious
rights of the proselytizer, as has the Court has made clear since Kokkinakis v.
Greece.
The CJEU has only touched lightly on this issue in a 2018 case of
Tietosuojavaltuutettu.265 There the CJEU likewise found no religious freedom
violation when a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged a Finnish privacy law
that prohibited them from keeping unregistered personal data gathered during
their door-to-door solicitation.266 The Witnesses kept a list of contacted people
who did not want to be contacted again.267 An EU directive required that such
personal data were subject to the protections of the EU privacy directive, and the
Witnesses were not exempt from compliance just because the data were
collected as part of their evangelical work.268 The EU’s interest in protecting
their privacy of all citizens outweighed the Witnesses’ interest in conducting
their evangelism without regulatory impediments.269
So far, the ECtHR has issued much more substantial case law on proselytism
than the CJEU. The Court’s contribution, however, does not provide guidance
beyond the basic rule that per se bans on proselytism violate Article 9. Balancing
countries with very different sensitivities on the topic has led to a case-by-case
balancing approach, rather than a set of broader and predictable principles.
2. Holy Days and Salary
The ECtHR generally has held against religious minorities who seek Article
9 accommodations to observe their holy days. While individual Member States
are free to adopt and apply their own religious holidays and Sabbath day laws,
their citizens have no prima facie right to observance of their holidays. Thus, in
Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a Muslim employee
263
See Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights
Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 326 (1999).
264
Nasirov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 58717/10, ¶¶ 59–60 (June 20, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-201088 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, ¶ 31 (1993)).
265
Case C-25/17, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0025 (July
10, 2018).
266
Id. ¶ 2.
267
Id. ¶¶ 16, 62.
268
Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, art. 2–3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38–39 (EC).
269
Tietosuojavaltuutettu, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0025 ¶ 18.
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was fined for taking a day off to celebrate a Muslim religious festival without
giving notice to his employer.270 He alleged violations of his Article 9 rights to
engage in religious worship.271 The Court rejected these claims, arguing that his
attendance at the religious festival was not a clear act of religious worship;
moreover, the ostensibly religious nature of the festival did not justify Kosteski’s
failure to notify his employer that he planned to miss work.272
Six years later, in Sessa v. Italy, a Jewish lawyer objected to a court order
that scheduled a hearing date on his religious holiday (Yom Kippur) without
granting a continuance in a case where he served as counsel.273 The ECtHR
found no Article 9 violation, concluding that the judge was acting reasonably to
vindicate the public’s right to the proper administration of justice, and the lawyer
could have arranged for substitute counsel at that hearing.274
In Cresco Investigation GmbH v. Markus Achatzi,275 the CJEU went further
and outlawed Austria’s law giving special treatment to Good Friday
observers.276 The law allowed members of selected Christian faiths to take Good
Friday off, or required their employers to give them double pay if they
worked.277 Non-members, however, had to work that day and with no extra
pay.278 An employee without the requisite religious affiliation sued, arguing that
this policy constituted indirect religious discrimination.279 The CJEU agreed that
this policy discriminated against non-Christians.280 Moreover, the Court said,
the Austrian law, paradoxically, incentivized and remunerated Christians for
breaching their religious obligations on Good Friday by doubling their salary for
working instead.281 As the CJEU could not strike down the Austrian law, it
ordered instead the domestic court to require “a private employer . . . also to

270
Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 55170/00, ¶¶ 3, 8, 9 (Apr. 13,
2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73342.
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22, 2019).
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grant his other employees a public holiday on Good Friday” or double pay if
they worked.282
3. Religious Dress Cases in the European Court of Human Rights
Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have weighed in heavily on issues of
religious dress and ornamentation. Until recently, the ECtHR has interpreted
Article 9 to allow states to impose restrictions on Muslim women who wore
headscarves in manifestation of their religion, but contrary to public school dress
codes. In each case, the Court sided with the Member State against the Muslim
petitioner, granting the State ample margins of appreciation to regulate this
controversial issue of Muslim female apparel. Other more recent Article 9 cases
involving religious apparel, however, have been more successful for religious
freedom claimants.
In Dahlab v. Switzerland, a state elementary schoolteacher, newly converted
to Islam from Catholicism, was banned from wearing a headscarf when she
taught her classes.283 The government highlighted the value of maintaining
secularism in a public school that was open to young students from various
traditions.284 Invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court determined
that this school dress code and its application to Ms. Dahlab were necessary and
proportionate, and dismissed her claim that the State had violated Article 9.285
The Court plainly admitted that it was “very difficult to assess the impact that a
powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the
freedom of conscience and religion of very young children.”286 But the Court
worried “that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytizing
effect,” especially since the teacher was acting as “a representative of the
State.”287 Moreover, the Court continued in rather explicit anti-Islamic tones, the
headscarf “appear[ed] to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the
principle of gender equality.”288 It was “therefore . . . difficult to reconcile the
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others
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and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic
society must convey to their pupils.”289
Accordingly, weighing the right of a teacher to manifest her religion
against the need to protect pupils by preserving religious harmony, the
Court considers that, in the circumstances of the case and having
regard, above all, to the tender age of the children for whom the
applicant was responsible as a representative of the State, the Geneva
authorities did not exceed their margin of appreciation and that the
measure they took was therefore not unreasonable.290

Dahlab was only the first of a series of decisions upholding bans on wearing
an Islamic headscarf in public. In its more recent cases, the Court largely
abandoned its proselytization-based rationale and displayed a rather hostile
attitude toward the public wearing of this garment. In Şahin v. Turkey,291 an
Islamic medical student at Istanbul University was forbidden to take certain
courses and exams because she was wearing a headscarf, contrary to state rules
governing dress. When the university brought disciplinary actions against her,
she filed an Article 9 claim.292 The Court sided with Turkey, and again granted
a “margin of appreciation” to the Turkish constitutional and cultural ideals of
gender equality and state secularism.293 “The principle of secularism,” the Court
noted, created “a modern public society in which equality was guaranteed to all
citizens without distinction on grounds of religion, denomination or sex.”294 It
made possible “[s]ignificant advances in women’s rights,” including “equality
of treatment in education, the introduction of a ban on polygamy,” and “the
presence of women in public life and their active participation in society.
Consequently, the ideas that women should be freed from religious constraints
and that society should be modernised had a common origin.”295 Since
“secularism” is “one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish state,” and
since this principle is “in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human
rights,” religious “attitude[s]” and actions to the contrary “will not enjoy the
protection of Article 9.”296
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The ECtHR continued on this path in Dogru v. France.297 There, a Muslim
girl refused to follow her public school’s dress code that required her to take off
her headscarf during physical education classes and sports events.298 Dismayed
by the breach of its rules and the tensions it caused among the other students,
the school initiated disciplinary action against her.299 When she persisted in her
claim to wear her headscarf in all public settings, the school offered to teach her
through a correspondence program.300 She and her parents rejected this, so she
was expelled from the school. She claimed violations of her Article 9 rights.301
The Court again held for the State, and again accorded France an ample “margin
of appreciation” for its state policy of secularism.302
In its most recent case on point, Osmanoǧlu v. Switzerland,303 the Court also
ruled against two Muslim girls whose parents challenged a Swiss public school’s
compulsory swimming lessons program that had boys and girls swimming
together in the same pool. The parents claimed that mixed-gender swimming
violated their and their daughters’ Article 9 rights, and they refused to send their
nine- and eleven-year-old daughters to swimming lessons.304 Although school
authorities offered to let the girls wear “burkinis” and change clothes in a private
dressing room, the parents insisted that mixed-gender swimming—even before
puberty—contradicted their religious belief and practice, since their daughters
were preparing to observe Muslim customs of female modesty as adults.305
Moreover, the girls were already taking private swimming lessons.306 Thus, the
parents sought a full exemption from the program.307 The Court, however,
determined that, although the swimming program interfered to some degree with
the applicants’ ability to manifest their religious beliefs, it also advanced
legitimate public goals beyond teaching children to swim, including, most
notably, fostering socio-economic inclusiveness and integration among a diverse
297
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student body.308 Insofar as Swiss authorities had also offered reasonable
accommodations, the program did not violate the parties’ Article 9 rights but fell
within the margin of appreciation for state decision-making about the best forms
and forums of education.309
The Court has also accepted alternative logics to support other state
restrictions on public displays of religious apparel. Twice the Court rejected
Article 9 complaints by airline passengers who were forced to remove religious
apparel during airport security checks. Safety concerns clearly outweighed
Article 9 rights, the Court stated.310 In Mann Singh v. France, the Court upheld
France’s decision to withhold a driver’s license from a Sikh who refused to
remove his turban for his picture on the license.311 France’s public safety
concerns again outweighed the applicant’s genuine religious interest in wearing
his turban at all times in public, the Court concluded.312
Similarly, in S.A.S. v. France, the Court upheld France’s controversial ban
on full-face coverings in public against a claim by a devout Muslim who wore
the niqab and burqa as expressions of her “religious, personal and cultural
faith.”313 The Court recognized that the ban interfered with her religion.314 It
rejected France’s arguments that the ban was justified because it promoted the
rights of women, protected safety and security, and respected the dignity and
equality of men and women alike.315 Instead, the Court embraced France’s
tertiary argument that the ban ensured and promoted “respect for the minimum
requirements of life in society”—namely, face-to-face communication.316
“[T]he face plays an important role in social interaction,” the Court reasoned,
and “individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see
practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of
an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life.”317
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El Morsli v. France, App. No. 15585/06, ¶ 1 (Mar. 4, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001117860 (finding no violation when a Muslim passenger was forced to remove her headscarf); Phull v. France,
2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 415 (finding no violation when a Sikh passenger was forced to remove his turban).
311
Mann Singh v. France, App. No. 24479/07 (Nov. 13, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00189848.
312
Id.
313
S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 353–54, ¶ 12.
314
Id. at 367, ¶ 107.
315
Id. at 370–71, ¶¶ 118, 120–21.
316
Id. at 371, ¶¶ 121–22; see also id. at 345, 355, 358–59, 369.
317
Id. at 371, ¶ 122.
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The Court held similarly in Ebrahimian v. France318 that the French authorities’
decision not to renew the contract of a Muslim social worker who worked at a
public hospital—and refused to take off her headscarf—did not violate her
Article 9 rights.319
In Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017),320 the ECtHR upheld a similar
Belgian ban on clothing that covers the face in whole or in part. Borrowing
heavily from S.A.S. v. France, the Court argued that the restriction sought to
guarantee the conditions of social coexistence and to protect the rights and
freedoms of others in a democratic society.321 The applicants in this case were
two Muslim women who were born and lived in Belgium.322 They chose to wear
the hijab in expression of their religious convictions.323 One of the applicants
had stopped wearing her hijab in public after the ban was enacted, while the
other chose to keep her hijab but remain at home to avoid violating the law and
risking a fine or even imprisonment.324 The Court affirmed that such laws
prohibiting religious headscarves would violate Article 9 if they lacked objective
and reasonable justifications or failed to advance a legitimate purpose or aim;325
states must also demonstrate a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the goals and means of such laws.326 However, while the headscarf ban
had far-reaching effects on the applicants and members of their religious
community, the Court held that Belgian authorities were best situated to
determine what was necessary in their society and should be granted an ample
margin of appreciation.327 In Dakir v. Belgium (2017),328 the ECtHR similarly
ruled that headscarf bans in various Belgian municipalities did not violate the
Article 9 rights of Muslim women.
In a few recent cases, however, the ECtHR has become more sympathetic
and upheld Article 9 claims involving religious clothing and ornamentation.329
318
319
320

Ebrahimian v. France, 2015-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 99.
Id. at 106, 134.
Belcacemi v. Belgium, App. No. 37798/13 (July 11, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-

175636.
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
Id. ¶ 66.
Id.
Id. ¶ 51.
Dakir v. Belgium, App. No. 4619/12, ¶ 68 (July 11, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-

175660.
329
A third relevant case, Barik Edidi v. Spain, App. No. 21780/13 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-163303, was dismissed for the failure to exhaust domestic remedies after the applicant failed to
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In Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey (2010), the Court found that Turkey had violated
Article 9 rights by arresting a group of Muslims for wearing, on a public street,
traditional religious garb including a turban, baggy trousers, a tunic, and a
stick.330 Local antiterrorism laws prohibited such dress, except during religious
ceremonies and on public holy days.331 The ECtHR stated that restrictions on
religious dress are permissible if they are explicitly designed to protect the state
principle of secularism in a democratic society, or to prevent disorder or
violation of the rights of others.332 But without such rationales, this antiterrorism
law was neither a necessary nor proportionate limitation on such religious dress
in public.333
Likewise, in Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom (2013), the Court
upheld the right of Ms. Eweida, a check-in staff member for British Airways, to
wear to work a small necklace with a crucifix that reflected her Coptic Christian
faith.334 When British Airways introduced a more rigid policy that prohibited
religious symbols, she refused to remove or hide the necklace.335 She was
suspended.336 Later, British Airways amended its policy, and Ms. Eweida
returned to work.337 She then sued to recover the income lost while suspended.338
After losing in British courts, she filed her case in Strasbourg.339 The ECtHR
held in favor of Ms. Eweida,340 arguing that her “insistence on wearing a cross
visibly at work was motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian
faith,”341 and that “there is no evidence of any real encroachment on the interests
of others.”342 It found that British Airways’s interference with Ms. Eweida’s
religious freedom was disproportionate, especially since the company had a
history of permitting turbans and hijabs in the past and had shifting policies on
religious apparel.343 It is notable in this case that U.K. law was silent on the right

lodge her appeal before the domestic court in time. Id. ¶¶ 46–49. The court could not therefore examine her other
grounds of appeal including the alleged violation of Article 9. This case concerned the Article 9 rights of a
lawyer to wear her hijab in a Spanish courtroom while representing her clients. Id. ¶ 30.
330
Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Feb. 23, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97535.
331
Id. ¶ 21.
332
Id. ¶ 43.
333
Id. ¶¶ 43, 52.
334
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215, 226, ¶ 12.
335
Id. 226, ¶ 13–14.
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id. at 226, ¶ 14.
339
Id. at 228, ¶ 17.
340
Id. at 257, ¶ 95.
341
Id. at 255, ¶ 89.
342
Id. at 257, ¶ 95.
343
Id. at 257, ¶ 94.

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

632

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:587

to wear religious clothing or symbols in the workplace, and it was her private
employer that had imposed the restriction.344 Nonetheless, the Court chose to
“consider the issues in terms of the positive obligation on the State authorities
to secure the rights under Article 9” even in the private sector.345 The ECtHR
balanced the concerns for danger, security, safety, or the rights of others against
her right to wear a small cross, and ruled in favor of the flight attendant.346
In Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2018), a divided Court upheld the
right of a Muslim defendant, indicted for a terroristic attack on the United States
Embassy, to wear his skullcap in a criminal court.347 The presiding judge had
repeatedly ordered the defendant to remove the skullcap, in accordance with
local court rules that defendants were not permitted to have head coverings of
any sort in the courtroom.348 The defendant protested that he wore the skullcap
out of religious duty, and he persisted despite the judge’s repeated orders and
time to reflect on the consequences.349 Eventually, the Court fined the defendant
for contempt of court, and then imprisoned him for thirty days for not paying the
fine.350 He appealed citing Articles 9 and 14 violations.351 The ECtHR held for
the defendant.352 It distinguished the cases of religious head coverings in the
workplace, since this case involved compulsory appearance, rather than
voluntary employment. The Court saw “no reason to doubt that the applicant’s
act was motivated by his sincere religious belief . . . without any hidden agenda
to make a mockery of the trial, incite others to reject secular and democratic
values or cause a disturbance. Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are
hallmarks of a ‘democratic society.’”353 And punishing this defendant for
contempt, the Court argued, “was not necessary in a democratic society,” even
though the local court generally deserved a wide margin of appreciation.354 A
few months later in another Article 9 case, the ECtHR held similarly that a
Belgian court was not justified in excluding a Muslim relative of a defendant
from visiting a courtroom just because she wore a veil.355
344

Id. at 256, ¶ 92.
Id. at 254, ¶ 84.
346
Id. In a companion case, the Court upheld a hospital decision to prohibit a geriatric nurse from wearing
her cross on duty in order to protect health and safety on the ward. Id. at 259, ¶¶ 100–01.
347
Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 57792/15 (Mar. 5, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-179219.
348
Id. ¶ 7.
349
Id.
350
Id. ¶ 9.
351
Id. ¶ 10.
352
Id. ¶ 43.
353
Id. ¶ 41 (internal citations omitted).
354
Id. ¶ 42.
355
Lachiri v. Belgium, App. No. 3413/09, ¶¶ 31–48 (Dec. 18, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001345
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4. Religious Dress Cases in the Court of Justice of the European Union
The CJEU has also weighed religious freedom claims of Muslim women to
the hijab at private workplaces, with mixed results, one favoring the Muslim
claimant, the other holding for her employer.
Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions356 concerned a dispute between a global
security company and Samira Achbita, a receptionist in its Belgian branch. She
had been employed in the company for a while before she started to wear the
hijab.357 This conflicted with the company dress code that required employees
to avoid wearing any visible religious signs or apparel, and she was ordered to
remove her hijab.358 When she refused, she was fired.359 Achbita sued G4S in a
Belgian court for religious discrimination in violation of an EU’s Council
Directive governing religion in the workplace.360
The CJEU found that the employer’s termination was not “direct
discrimination” under the Directive, for its neutral dress code did not target any
specific religious faith.361 Nor was it “indirect discrimination,” since the
company had a stated legitimate interest in pursuing a policy of religious
neutrality reflected in its prohibition of visible religious apparel in its
workplace.362 The CJEU weighed this right to preserve a religiously neutral
environment against Achbita’s new religious claim to wear the Islamic
headscarf, and found that the indirect discrimination caused by the dress code
was proportionate and therefore lawful.363
The Achbita Court cited ECtHR case law in ruling that a private employer’s
consistent general policy of maintaining religious, political, or philosophical
neutrality in the private workplace was a legitimate aim under both the European
Convention and EU employment law. “An employer’s wish to project an image
of neutrality” to its employees and customers must outweighs any restriction
“imposed on the freedom of religion.”364

186461.
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364

Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 WL CELEX 62015CJ0157 (Mar. 14, 2017).
Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 30–32.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶¶ 37–39.
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Bougnaoui v. Micropole also involved wearing a hijab at work, but here her
French employer had no clear dress code or policy on religious apparel.365 When
Micropole hired Ms. Bougnaoui, they told her that “the wearing of an Islamic
headscarf might pose a problem when she was in contact with customers of the
company.”366 Bougnaoui first wore a bandana, later, a hijab.367 Neither head
covering met with objection.368 Micropole eventually hired her as a design
engineer,369 and she went to work for one of the company’s customers at the
customer’s site. The customer complained to the company that “the wearing of
a veil . . . had upset a number of its employees. It also requested that there should
be ‘no veil next time.’”370
Micropole then fired Bougnaoui.371 The company stated that she had been
warned from the beginning of her internship that wearing a veil could become a
problem, and that the company retained “discretion . . . as regards the expression
of the personal preferences of [the] employees.”372 The company further stated
that, during the job interview, their officials had asked Bougnaoui if she had any
difficulty respecting “the need for neutrality” when in the presence of customers,
and she had “answered in the negative.”373 Therefore, the company found that
Bougnaoui could not “provide services at [the] customers’ premises.”374
Bougnaoui sued for religious discrimination under EU law.375 The CJEU
found that Ms. Bougnaoui had been victim of direct discrimination on religious
grounds. She had been dismissed because a company’s customer complained
about her headscarf.376 Even though she had been warned about Micropole’s
neutrality policy, this policy had not been enforced until that customer
complained. The CJEU again cited ECtHR cases in arguing that Bougnaoui’s
claim to wear religious dress deserved presumptive religious freedom
protection.377 While EU law permitted employers to place limits on that religious
freedom, it could do so only by a “genuine and determining occupational
requirement” that was “objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377

Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017 WL CELEX 62015CJ0188 (Mar. 14, 2017).
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 30.
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activities concerned or of the context in which they [were] carried out.”378 But
this was not the case here. Ms. Bougnaoui was ordered to remove her headscarf
not in implementation of the company’s neutral dress policy, but only “to take
account of the particular wishes of the customer.”379 That did not justify such
discrimination.380
It is worth noting that the AG, while opining in favor of Ms. Bougnaoui,
made clear that employers could regulate religious apparel in the workplace,
particularly full head coverings. “Western society regards visual or eye contact
as being of fundamental importance in any relationship involving face-to-face
communication . . . . [A] rule that imposed a prohibition on wearing religious
apparel that covers the eyes and face entirely whilst performing a job that
involved such contact with customers would be proportionate.”381 Although the
AG did not cite ECtHR case law, she was clearly echoing S.A.S. v. France and
other recent ECtHR cases that upheld Member State bans on the niqab and
burqa. Her message was that employers, too, could use clear and consistent
policies to put comparable limits on religious apparel without violating religious
freedom and non-discrimination norms.382
Litigation about religious dress has been a staple of ECtHR jurisprudence
and is now becoming prominent in CJEU case law on religious freedom. The
topic will always generate controversy. Religious apparel pits secularism against
religiosity, and often majorities against minorities. It channels the debates about
the role and the content of the public sphere, challenges a country’s cultural
legacy, and brings to the surface disputes about migrants. The ECtHR has been
quite deferential to the state’s discretion, while the CJEU seems to support
employers that enforce an approach of strict neutrality.
5. Religious Slaughtering Restrictions
In two recent cases, the CJEU dealt with halal (Islamic) ritual slaughtering
practices. Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen
VZW and Others (2018)383 concerned a specific provision of a broader regulation
on animal food production.384 The general EU rule requires that animals be
378

Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶ 40.
380
Id.
381
Id. ¶ 130.
382
Id. ¶ 30.
383
Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZW and
Others v. Gewest, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 (May 29, 2018).
384
Regulation 1099/2009 of Sept. 24, 2009 on the Protection of Animals at the Time of Killing, 2009 O.J.
379
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slaughtered only after stunning them.385 However, since halal religious rules
require that the animal be awake during slaughtering, EU law carves out an
exception, allowing such ritual slaughtering so long as it performed in licensed
slaughterhouses.386 The latter requirement was challenged in this case.
The dispute started in Belgian Flanders.387 On the few days of Eid Al-Adha
(the Feast of the Sacrifice), a major Islamic holiday, Islamic ritual slaughtering
normally peaked.388 Until 2015, the Flemish authorities had accommodated the
extra demand for halal meat in preparation for the festival by licensing local
temporary slaughterhouses for Islamic butchers.389 In 2015, however, the
authorities announced they would no longer issue approvals for temporary
slaughter plants on the ground that such licenses violated EU rules on the
structural and hygiene requirements for slaughterhouses.390 Flemish Muslim
communities sued in state court, claiming that this new denial infringed upon
their religious freedom to celebrate the Feast properly.391 Under this new rule,
they argued, the only way to meet the peak demand for halal meat would be to
build a series of permanent slaughterhouses that would be of no use for the rest
of the year.392 The local judge issued a request for a preliminary ruling, asking
that the CJEU rule whether the EU regulation on ritual slaughtering, as
implemented by national legislation, violated Article 9 of the ECHR, Article 10
of the EU Charter, or an EU law which calls the EU Council to fight
discrimination on various grounds, including religion.393
The CJEU acknowledged the religious salience of the matter394 during the
“religious rite” of the Feast.395 But it refused to resolve what it called “the
(L 303) 1 (EC).
385
Id. art. 4, ¶ 1.
386
Id. art. 4, ¶ 4.
387
Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen, VZW and
Others v. Gewest, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426, ¶¶ 16–18 (Nov. 30, 2017)
388
Id. ¶ 3.
389
Id.
390
Id. ¶ 16; see Regulation 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr., 2004 on
Laying Down Specific Hygiene Rules for Food of Animal Origin, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 55, amended by 2004 O.J.
(L 226) 22.
391
Van Moskeeën, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 ¶¶ 18–19.
392
Id. ¶ 70.
393
Id. ¶ 37; see TFEU, supra note 29, art. 13 (“In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture,
fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and
the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals,
while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.”).
394
Van Moskeeën, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 ¶ 44.
395
Id. ¶ 51.
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theological debate among different religious tendencies within the Muslim
community as to whether the obligation to slaughter animal[s] without prior
stunning during the Feast of Sacrifice is absolute and the existence of alternative
solutions in the event that it is impossible to perform such slaughter.”396 The
Court thought EU law had done enough “to ensure effective observance of the
freedom of religion, in particular of practicing Muslims during the Feast of
Sacrifice.”397 Requiring that such ritual slaughtering must be performed in
licensed slaughterhouses properly balanced the parties’ religious freedom
interests with the EU’s interest in avoiding “excessive and unnecessary suffering
of animals killed.”398 The EU’s general slaughtering laws thus did not infringe
upon religious freedom under the Charter.399 The real challenge, the Court noted,
was not to religious freedom, but to the financial cost for a local Islamic
community in Belgium to set up permanent slaughterhouses for only a few days
of use.400
The 2019 CJEU case of Œuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs401 also
involved halal slaughtering practices.402 EU law reserved the “organic” label for
food that had been produced in accordance with high animal welfare

396

Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 56.
398
Id. ¶ 65.
399
Id. ¶ 59.
400
Id. ¶¶ 70, 77–78. As this Article was going to final press, the CJEU issued Centraal Israëltisch
Consistorie van België and Others. Case C‑336/19, Centraal Israëltisch Consistorie van België and Others (Dec.
17,
2020),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=235717&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18489626. A new Flemish regulation required Jewish and Muslim butchers,
even in their own slaughtering houses, to use a non-lethal form of stunning before cutting the animal’s throat
and letting it bleed out fully. This would spare the animal the pain and suffering of having its throat cut, but it
ensured that the animal would regain consciousness before bleeding to death as religious ritual laws required.
Jewish and Muslim litigants claimed violations of their religious freedom rights under EU Law; Articles 10, 21,
and 22 of the EU Charter; and Article 9 of the European Convention. They argued that the new law specially
burdened their core religious rituals and violated their ancient religious laws, obstructed religious butchers from
practicing their traditional faith, deprived religious consumers of kosher and halal meat, and discriminatorily
targeted the small communities of Jews and Muslims while leaving hunters, fishers, and other sportsmen to kill
their captured animals without prior stunning. The Grand Chamber of the CJEU recognized the burden of
religious freedom but judged it a permissible and non-discriminatory protection of animal welfare, arguing that
Belgium “deserved a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether, and to what extent, a limitation of the
right to manifest religion or beliefs is ‘necessary’.” Id. ¶ 67.
401
Case C-497/17, Œuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs v. Ministre de L’Agriculture et de
l’Alimentation, 2019 WL CELEX 62017CJ0497 (Feb. 26, 2019).
402
Commission Regulation 889/2008 of Sept. 5, 2008 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of Regulation No 834/2007, 2008 O.J. (L 250) 1 (EC), amended by Regulation 271/2010 of
Mar. 24, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 84) 19 (EU); Council Regulation 834/007 of June 28, 2007 on Organic Production
and Labelling of Organic Products and Repealing Regulation 2092/91 (EEC), 2007 O.J. (L 189) 1 (EC).
397
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standards.403 The issue was whether halal meat could be labeled “organic” when
ritual slaughtering was performed without previous stunning, thus causing pain
to the animals.404 The CJEU ruled that halal ritual slaughtering practices and
organic food labeling were irreconcilable.405 The requirement that animals be
stunned was meant to ensure that the animals avoid pain and suffering.406
Slaughtering without stunning was an exceptional regime, “authorised only by
way of derogation in the European Union and solely in order to ensure
observance of the freedom of religion,” but “insufficient to remove all of the
animal’s pain, distress and suffering as effectively as slaughter with prestunning.”407 Ritual slaughtering did not meet the high requirements of animal
welfare that were among the core goals of organic food production and of the
“organic” logo altogether.408 While religious freedom norms were strong enough
to allow for an exception to general slaughtering rules, they did not entitle a
further exception to organic food labeling rules.
The CJEU’s approach to religious slaughtering requirements is rather
narrow. Despite the AG’s efforts, the Court has adamantly denied Islamic
slaughtering’s compatibility with the requirements of “organic” food. Similarly,
it has not accommodated the Islamic community’s request to perform ritual
slaughter in temporary facilities although it was customary until recently.
C. Religious Group Protections
Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have issued important cases concerning
religious group rights. The ECtHR has been more protective of the rights and
autonomy of religious groups over their own polity, property, and personnel,
even when faced with claims brought by their own members against the religious
leadership. The CJEU has been less deferential to religious groups in its first few
cases on point, often holding for individuals against religious authorities.
1. Religious Personality, Autonomy, and Legal Limits
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, along with Article
11 (on freedom of assembly and association), protects religious groups from
undue state intrusion, interference, or discriminatory regulation.409 These
403
404
405
406
407
408
409

Œuvre d’assistance aux bêtes, 2019 WL CELEX 62017CJ0497 ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 48.
Id. ¶ 52.
Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14,
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Articles on their face and as applied by the Court protect religious groups per se,
recognizing their rights to legal personality and religious autonomy.410 These
religious groups have rights to maintain their own standards of teaching,
practice, membership, and discipline; to devise their own forms of polity and
organization; to hold property; to lease facilities; to make contracts; to open bank
accounts; to hire and pay employees, suppliers, and service providers; to
maintain relations with coreligionists at home and abroad; to publish their
literature; and to operate worship centers, clerical housing, seminaries, schools,
charities, mission groups, hospitals, and cemeteries.411
The ECtHR has repeatedly held that Member States may not arbitrarily or
discriminatorily withhold, withdraw, or condition a religious group’s right to
acquire legal personality,412 to procure the necessary state licenses for religious
marriages, nursery schools, or educational programs for their members,413 or to
receive state funding or other state benefits available to other properly registered
religious groups.414 Nor may the state impose an exorbitant or discriminatory tax
on a religious organization that jeopardizes the organization’s ability to
operate.415 Moreover, even if a religious group will not or cannot register as a
separate legal entity, the state may not prohibit, intervene, or interfere with their
collective worship or assembly in private homes or settings.416 All these State
actions, the ECtHR has held, violate Article 9 rights of religion and sometimes
violate Article 11 and Article 14 rights of association and nondiscrimination. As
the Court stated in 2000:
[R]eligious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form
of organized structures. They abide by rules which are often seen by
followers as being of a divine origin. Religious ceremonies have their

art. 9, 11, Nov. 4, 1950.
410
JULIAN RIVERS, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED RELIGIONS: BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND SECULARISM 53
(2010).
411
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App No. 302/02, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 141, 167–68, ¶ 102
(2010); Metro. Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 113–14, ¶ 118.
412
Metro. Church of Bessarabia, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 110, 119; Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, App. No.
15452/07, ¶¶ 25, 31 (May 10, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-151006.
413
Savez Crkava “Riječ Života” and Others v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, ¶ 58 (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102173.
414
Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 472.
415
Affaire Association les Témoins de Jéhovah v. France, App. No. 8916/05, ¶ 53 (June 30, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105386.
416
Masaev v. Moldova, App. No. 6303/05, 57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 185, 191, ¶ 26 (2013); see also Cumhuriyetçi
Eğitim Ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey, App. No. 32093/10, ¶¶ 9, 52 (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148275 (finding a violation of Article 14 combined with Article 9, in a case
where Turkey refused to grant the status of a place of worship, and the Court found no need to conduct a separate
examination into Article 9).
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meaning and sacred value for the believers if they have been conducted
by ministers empowered for that purpose in compliance with these
rules. The personality of the religious ministers is undoubtedly of
importance to every member of the community. Participation in the
life of the community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion,
protected by Article 9.417

The ECtHR has placed special emphasis on the autonomy of religious
bodies. In a 2013 case, for example, it opined:
The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable
for pluralism in a democratic society and is an issue at the very heart
of the protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not only
the organisation of these communities as such but also the effective
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all their active
members.418

In implementing this religious autonomy principle, the ECtHR has held that a
State may not force a religious group to admit new members, to exclude a
member whom the State disfavors, or to retain a member who has departed or
dissented from the group’s teachings or practices.419 So long as the group
respects the individual’s right to leave without impediment or interference, the
group’s internal authority trumps the individual’s right to participate as a
member of that group.420
The ECtHR has also held that States may not interfere in the resolution of
internal disputes over church leadership, force denominations to unite or divide,
compel them to accept one religious official over another, or prevent them from
amending their internal legal structures or canons.421 Even in those countries that
have established churches or favored traditional religions, the Court held in a
2001 case that Article 9
excludes assessment by the State of the legitimacy of religious beliefs
or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed. State measures
favouring a particular leader or specific organs of a divided religious
community or seeking to compel the community or part of it to place
417

Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 117, 137, ¶ 62.
Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 63, ¶ 136 (citing Hasan, 2000-XI
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 137, ¶ 62).
419
Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, App. No. 77703/01, ¶ 146 (Sept. 14, 2007), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-81067.
420
Holy Synod v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 412/03 & 35677/04, ¶ 29 (Sept. 16, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-100433; Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, App. No. 77703/01 ¶ 150.
421
Holy Synod, App. Nos. 412/03 & 35677/04 ¶ 29; Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, App. No. 77703/01
¶ 150; Hasan, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 144, ¶ 86; Serif v. Greece, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, 88–89, ¶ 54.
418
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itself, against its will, under a single leadership, would also constitute
an infringement of the freedom of religion.422

In a later case, the ECtHR stated further: “While it may be necessary for the
State to reconcile the interests of the various religions and religious groups”
when they come into conflict, “the State has a duty to remain neutral and
impartial in exercising its regulatory authority and in its relations with the
various religions, denominations and groups within them.”423
Despite this insistence on state neutrality to religion and deference to
religious autonomy, the ECtHR has allowed governments to regulate and restrict
the activities of registered religious organizations “to protect its institutions and
citizens.”424 These limitations, the ECtHR has said, “must be used sparingly, as
exceptions to the rule” and allowed only for “convincing and compelling
reasons” and in cases of “pressing social need.”425 But some limitations have
passed muster under Article 9 review. In Şerífe Yiğit v. Turkey (2010), for
example, the Court upheld Turkey’s law that required couples to marry
monogamously in a civil ceremony before a state official.426 Turkish law does
not recognize a religious marriage ceremony as sufficient to create a valid
marriage, and the state threatened to imprison any religious official or group
who presided over a marriage without a prior civil registration of the marriage.427
The stated purpose of the Turkish law, as the Court saw it, “was to protect
women against polygamy. If religious marriages were to be considered lawful[,]
all the attendant religious consequences would have to be recognized, for
instance the fact that a [Muslim] man could marry four women.”428
In the case of Ouardiri v. Switzerland (2011), the ECtHR further upheld
Switzerland’s new constitutional amendment prohibiting the building of
minarets against the claim that this violated the rights of Muslims to have
suitable mosques for public worship.429 The Court dismissed the claim, arguing

422

Metro. Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 113, ¶ 117.
Holy Synod, App. Nos. 412/03 & 35677/04 ¶ 119; see also Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház v.
Hungary, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 475–76, ¶ 115 (holding that a new Hungarian law that deregistered several
longstanding minority churches in the state was a violation of Articles 9 and 11).
424
Magyar Keresztény, 2104-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 79.
425
Id. (quoting Gorzelik v. Poland, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 219, 262, ¶¶ 94–95).
426
Serife Yiğit v. Turkey, App. No. 3976/05, ¶ 39 (Nov. 2, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001101579.
427
Id. ¶ 84.
428
Id. ¶ 62.
429
See Press Release, Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts., Prohibition on Building Minarets in Switzerland: Applications
Inadmissible (July 8, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-3602217-4080719.
423

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

642

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:587

that, since the claimant was complaining against a constitutional provision with
general applicability, there was no real victim in the case.430
But the ECtHR has stepped in with Article 9 protections when local religious
communities were victimized by their neighbors and did not receive help from
the police or other state authorities.431 The case of 97 Members of the Gldani
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses & 4 Others v. Georgia (2007) provides a
good illustration.432 There, local Orthodox Christians repeatedly attacked and
intimidated a local group of Jehovah’s Witnesses in an effort to drive them out
of the community or force them to convert to Orthodoxy.433 The Witnesses were
repeatedly assaulted and beaten with crosses, whips, and sticks—sometimes
resulting in serious injuries.434 Their literature was burned and their worship
services were interrupted.435 One man was shaved bald and forced to listen to
Orthodox prayers designed to convert him.436 Further, all of these actions were
filmed and aired on national television.437 Local authorities did nothing, despite
hearing 784 formal complaints, because they perceived the Witnesses “as a
threat to Christian orthodoxy.”438 The ECtHR held that this gross state
indifference was a clear violation of the Witnesses’ Article 9 rights.439 It
explained that freedom of religion means that one group may not “apply
improper pressure on others from a wish to promote one’s religious
convictions.”440
[T]he role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the
competing groups tolerate each other. This State role is conducive to
public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society
and can hardly be conceived as being likely to diminish the role of a
faith or a Church with which the population of a specific country has
historically and culturally been associated.441

430

Id.
Gldani Congregation v. Georgia, App. No. 71156/01, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 613, 649, ¶¶ 151–52 (2007).
432
Id.
433
Id. at 622, ¶¶ 11–12.
434
Id. at 623–24, ¶¶ 15, 21.
435
Id. at 625, ¶ 30.
436
Id. at 623, ¶ 18.
437
Id. at 626, ¶ 34.
438
Id. at 646, ¶ 133.
439
Id. at 646, ¶ 135.
440
Id. at 646, ¶ 132 (citing Larissis v. Greece, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., 362, 381–82, ¶¶ 54, 59; Serif v.
Greece, 199-IX Eir. Ct. H.R. 73, 88, ¶ 53; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
267, 301–02, ¶ 91).
441
Id.; see also Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02, 49 Eur. H.R. 355, 369, ¶ 62 (2007) (finding an
Article 9 violation for a state’s failure to prosecute officials who had illegally broken up a Jehovah’s Witness
431
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Likewise in Dimitrova v. Bulgaria (2015), the Court condemned local
authorities’ actions against a local chapter of an international Evangelical group,
The Word of Life.442 Authorities had first refused to permit the group to register
as a religious body, then further restricted and intervened into the group’s private
home meetings, seizing their assets in a raid.443 The government alleged that this
group was a dangerous sect that isolated members from their families and
prohibited them from getting medical care, going to school, watching television,
or reading any literature besides the Bible.444 The group charged the government
with religious discrimination.445 The Court held for the Word of Life group
under Article 9.446 The state’s actions were not prescribed by law, not neutral
and impartial, and “failed to respect the need for true religious pluralism.”447
Similarly, in Association for Solidarity with Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others
v. Turkey (2016), the ECtHR stepped in to stop the government’s interference
with the right of a peaceable religious group to worship privately.448 In this case,
groups of Jehovah Witnesses alleged that the Turkish government violated their
Article 9 rights by making it nearly impossible for them to conduct worship
services.449 For many years, these groups could worship in private premises.450
However, a new Urban Planning Law limited religious gatherings to designated
places of worship.451 The authorities ordered these private worship premises
closed and prohibited worship services at any other private apartment in the
district.452 They further denied the group’s later application to build a place of
worship and rejected their subsequent appeal to an administrative court.453 All
this, the Court held, violated the Witnesses’ Article 9 rights; it was neither
proportionate to a legitimate aim, nor necessary in a democratic society.454

Sunday worship service).
442
Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 15452/07, ¶ 30 (May 10, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001151006.
443
Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.
444
Id. ¶ 7.
445
Id. ¶ 3.
446
Id. ¶¶ 48.
447
Id. ¶ 25.
448
Ass’n for Solidarity with Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Turkey, App. Nos. 36915/10 & 8606/13, ¶¶ 3, 108
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163107.
449
Id. ¶ 3.
450
Id. ¶ 8.
451
Id. ¶ 66.
452
Id. ¶¶ 10, 36.
453
Id. ¶¶ 30, 35–36.
454
Id. ¶ 108.

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

644

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:587

The Court held similarly two years later when a Ukrainian city council
refused to grant Jehovah’s Witnesses a building permit to convert a private
residence into a church building.455 A Ukrainian local court had found that the
city council had improperly rejected the church’s application because of the
“vaguely described opposition from neighbours.”456 But the city council still
refused to cooperate, so the Witnesses claimed an Article 9 violation.457 The
ECtHR repeated its earlier opinions that while “the Convention does not
guarantee the right to be given a place to worship as such[,] . . . using buildings
as places of worship is important for the participation in the life of the religious
community and thus for the right to manifestation of religion” under Article 9.458
Here, the Court found the city’s “conduct was arbitrary and ‘not in accordance
with the law.’”459
In the case of Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria (2017), the Court also found
a violation of Article 9 as well as Article 11.460 Here, Bulgarian authorities had
refused to register an Ahmadi Muslim community as an official denomination,
ostensibly because their community’s constitution lacked a precise and clear
indication of the beliefs and rites of the Ahmadi religion, as required by the
Religions Act, which sought to distinguish between the various religions and to
avoid confrontation between religious communities.461 The ECtHR held that this
refusal amounted to a violation of Article 9.462 The state was to remain neutral
between religious beliefs and groups and did not have a valid interest in
preventing religious sub-groups from forming their own separate organizations
instead of integrating into larger religious communities.463
These cases on religious autonomy fall into two main patterns. On the one
hand, the Court has rejected blunt discrimination, victimization, and persecution
of religious minorities, as well as stigmatized state intervention in religious
matters. On the other hand, religious communities are not laws unto themselves
and are subject to permissible limitations designed to protect the health, safety,

455
Religious Cmty. of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Kryvyi Rih’s Ternivsky District v. Ukraine, App. No.
21477/10, ¶¶ 55, 57, 59 (Dec. 3, 2019) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195539.
456
Id. ¶ 54.
457
Id. ¶ 55.
458
Id. ¶¶ 49–50 (citing Griechische Kirchengemeinde München v. Germany, App. No. 52336/99 (Sept.
18, 2007); Izzettin Dogan v. Turkey, App. No. 62649/10, ¶ 111 (Apr. 26, 2016)).
459
Id. ¶¶ 57 (internal quotations omitted).
460
Metodiev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 58088/08, ¶ 48 (Sept. 15, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001174412.
461
Id. ¶¶ 3, 12
462
Id. ¶ 48.
463
Id. ¶ 46.
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and welfare of the community and the fundamental rights of others. The issue is
how to draw a line between discrimination and permissible limitations. So far,
the ECtHR has accepted only exceptional and narrow limitations on religious
autonomy. But if religious communities become more abusive—or their past
abuses comes to light, as evident in the recent pedophilia and financial scandals
involving Christian churches—these limitations are likely to grow.
2. Religious Employers and Labor Rights
The exact line between the autonomous religious and regulable secular
dimensions of a religious group has proved hardest to negotiate in cases of labor
and employment.464 In these cases, the ECtHR and CJEU have diverged quite
significantly. In general terms, the ECtHR has held that States may not force a
church to accept the unionization of its clerical and lay employees, since that
“would therefore be likely to undermine the Church’s traditional hierarchical
structure . . . [and] create a real risk to the autonomy of the religious
community.”465 A state may not force a church to retain the services of a
religious education teacher who publicly opposed its religious doctrines,466 or a
public relations director who committed adultery in violation of church teaching
and in breach of his employment contract.467 Conversely, the CJEU has been
more prone to second-guess a church body’s judgment on the religious angles
of work relations.
The ECtHR’s case law on the rights of individuals employed by religious
organizations reached its apex in the 2014 case of Fernández Martínez v.
Spain.468 Fernández Martínez was an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic
Church.469 In 1984, he had sought, but was denied, a dispensation from the
obligation of clerical celibacy.470 The following year he married a woman in a
civil ceremony.471 Together they had five children.472 In 1991 he was employed
464

Daniel Sabbagh, Discrimination in the Workplace: Toward a Transatlantic Comparison, 102 DROIT
321, 331 (2019).
465
Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 68–69, ¶¶ 161–62.
466
Fernández Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 490–91, ¶¶ 149–50.
467
Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 51 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-100463.
But cf. Schüth v. Germany, 2010-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 403, 426, ¶¶ 3, 67 (involving an organist in a Catholic
Church who was fired for his adultery). In Schüth, the Court said that the pro forma approval of this discharge
by the employment tribunal in Germany did not go far enough to protect the organist’s right to privacy under
Article 8 of the Convention. Id. at 399–401.
468
Fernández Martínez, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449.
469
Id. at 459, ¶ 13.
470
Id.
471
Id.
472
Id.
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in a state-run secondary school of the Region of Murcia.473 He taught Catholic
religion and ethics pursuant to an agreement between the Holy See and Spain.474
Per the agreement, public authorities can assign such teaching posts only to
teachers who have been proposed every year by the diocesan Bishop.475
While Fernández Martínez was teaching Catholic religion and ethics, he
participated in the activities of an association advocating for married priests.476
He wrote articles defending his views, and a picture of him and his family was
posted in a local newspaper.477 He finally received a dispensation from the rules
of mandatory clerical celibacy from the Pope in 1997.478 Within weeks, the local
Diocese informed the Ministry of Education that Fernández Martínez’s
assignment had been terminated,479 and the Ministry duly notified him.480 The
Diocese also issued a statement, explaining that it had terminated the contract
because of Fernández Martínez’s marital status, which was now common
knowledge and ran the risk of causing “scandal” among the students and their
Catholic families.481
Fernández Martínez sued in state court citing the right to equality and to
privacy, as well as the freedom of expression.482 Having lost, he brought his
claim to Strasbourg, complaining that the State had failed to protect his Article
8 rights under the ECHR,483 which reads: “Everyone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”484 Fernández
Martínez lost before both the first Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR.485 A divided Grand Chamber found no violation of Article 8.486 The
limitation imposed on Fernández Martínez’s rights was in accordance with state
law, and his dismissal was consistent with church canon law.487 The ECtHR
found that the limitation was in pursuance of a “legitimate aim” of protecting
the freedom “of the Catholic Church, and in particular its autonomy in respect
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487

Id. at 459, ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461, ¶ 16.
Id. at 460–61, ¶ 136.
Id. at 461, ¶ 16.
Id. at 461, ¶ 17.
Id. at 461–62, ¶ 19.
Id.
Id. at 465–69, ¶¶ 38–48.
Id. at 469–70, ¶ 68.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
Fernández Martínez, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 470, 491, ¶¶ 71, 153.
Id. at 469–70, ¶ 68.
Id. at 480–81, ¶¶ 118–21.
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of the choice of persons accredited to teach religious doctrine.”488 The Court
found that among the Member States there was no consensus on the scope of
religious autonomy, and thus each State in the Council of Europe had ample
discretion to devise and implement its rules and procedures in this field.489
Finally, the ECtHR noted that religious organizations had a right to expect
loyalty from those who, like Fernández Martínez, represented them at the
societal level.490 Considering the circumstances of the case and the publicity that
the applicant gave to his situation, the Court found that the balance of rights
struck in favor of the church was not disproportionate.491
By contrast to the ECtHR, the CJEU has confronted the status of religiously
affiliated institutions in the framework of labor relations.492 Many EU provisions
are at play in the labor field. Declaration 11, annexed to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, established the EU’s respect for the domestic settlements between
church and state.493 EU law protects the freedom of religious groups, as we have
seen.494 More specifically, the EU’s anti-discrimination Directive specifies what
religious autonomy means for labor relations.495 Recital No. 24 of this Directive
affirms that “Member States may maintain or lay down specific provisions on
genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirements which might be
required for carrying out an occupational activity.”496 But Article 4(2) of the
same Directive allows that:
in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public
or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or
belief, a difference of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief
shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of
these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a
person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified
occupational requirement.497

488

Id. at 481, ¶ 122.
Id. at 481–84, ¶¶ 123–30.
490
Id. at 484, ¶ 131.
491
Id. at 486–88, 491, ¶¶ 136–42, 152.
492
See, e.g., Case C-414/16, Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwickiung eV, 2018
WL CELEX 62016CJ0414 (Apr. 17, 2018); Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0068 (Sept. 11,
2018).
493
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 11, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 133.
494
RIVERS, supra note 410, at 36.
495
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 95, art. 1.
496
Id. Recital No. 24.
497
Id. art. 4, ¶ 2.
489
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The CJEU, however, has not interpreted these rules to endorse a “hands off”
approach, granting autonomy to religious institutions to conduct their own
internal labor relations.498 On the contrary, the CJEU has tried to draw a clear
line between what remains within religious autonomy and what is justiciable
under EU law.499
Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV (2018)
raised the question of whether a religious organization could make religious
affiliation a condition for employment.500 A Protestant institution advertised a
new job that involved producing a report on the United Nations International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
various related activities, including presenting the project to the political world
and to the general public.501 The advertisement stated that the candidates had to
be members of “a Protestant church or a church” belonging to the Working
Group of Christian Churches in Germany.502 Ms. Egenberger applied, although
she was not religiously affiliated.503 After being shortlisted for the job, she was
not offered an interview.504 She sued the Protestant institution in German court,
complaining about the religious affiliation requirement.505
The German court sent a preliminary ruling request to the CJEU, asking
whether the Directive allowed that:
an employer . . . or the church on its behalf, may itself authoritatively
determine whether a particular religion of an applicant, by reason of
the nature of the activities or of the context in which they are carried
out, constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational
requirement, having regard to the employer or church’s ethos[.]506

The CJEU noted that the ECtHR in Fernández Martínez clearly stated that
“the Member States and their authorities, including judicial authorities, must,
except in very exceptional cases, refrain from assessing whether the actual ethos
of the church or organisation concerned is legitimate.”507 But the CJEU also
noted that EU labor law called for the national court to strike a proper balance
498
Case C-414/16, Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwickiung eV, 2018 WL
CELEX 62016CJ0414, ¶¶ 54–55 (Apr. 17, 2018).
499
Id.
500
Id.
501
Id. ¶ 24.
502
Id. ¶ 25.
503
Id. ¶ 26.
504
Id.
505
Id. ¶ 27.
506
Id. ¶ 41.
507
Id. ¶ 61 (citing Fernández Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 484, ¶ 129).
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between competing interests and values, and to review whether the alleged
discrimination fell within the scope of the EU Directive.508 Local courts had to
judge whether a church or another religious organization had lawfully exercised
its right to religious autonomy. This approach necessarily entailed religious linedrawing. The CJEU further noted that the “nature” of the activities and job
responsibilities by the person who had allegedly suffered from religious
discrimination and the “context” within which they were carried out had to guide
the local court’s review.509 A domestic judge had to look for the “objectively
verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement
imposed by the employer and the activity concerned.”510
The Egenberger Court further clarified how the balancing assessment had to
be carried out, giving the domestic court three precise criteria for judgment.511
According to the EU directive, an act of seeming religious discrimination was
lawful only if the religious requirement imposed by the employer was “genuine,
legitimate and justified.”512 To be found genuine required proof that “professing
the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded
must appear necessary because of the importance of the occupational activity in
question for the manifestation of that ethos or the exercise by the church or
organisation of its right of autonomy.”513 To be legitimate, the affiliation
requirement could “not [be] used to pursue an aim that ha[d] no connection with
that ethos or with the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of
autonomy.”514 To be justified, the “church or organisation imposing the
requirement [had] to show, in the light of the factual circumstances of the case,
that the supposed risk of causing harm to its ethos or to its right of autonomy is
probable and substantial, so that imposing such a requirement is indeed
necessary.”515
In conducting this assessment, the CJEU made clear that domestic judges
had to balance the competing interests.516 If the stated religious qualifications
put forward by the church or religious organization were deemed ill-founded,
the domestic court would have to “ensure within its jurisdiction the judicial

508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516

Id. ¶¶ 51–53.
Id. ¶¶ 61–62.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 64 (referencing Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 95, art. 4, ¶ 2).
Id. ¶ 65.
Id. ¶ 66.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 61.

WITTEPIN_1.21.21

650

2/1/2021 11:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:587

protection for individuals” suffering from the discrimination and its effects.517
The CJEU thus did not rule specifically on the complainant’s claim, but gave the
domestic court the criteria to decide the case and not simply defer because of the
religious employer’s claim to autonomy.518
While Egenberger concerned hiring,519 IR v. JQ (2018) concerned the firing
of an employee by a religious organization, and the CJEU again gave local courts
detailed direction in judging discrimination claims.520 IR was a nonprofit
organization established under German law and subject to the supervision of the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cologne.521 Its institutional goal consisted in
carrying out the work of the Catholic federation of charitable organizations
called Caritas, including the operation of its hospitals.522 IR was subject to the
Basic Regulations on Employment Relationships in the Services of the Church
issued by church institutions.523 Such rules subjected all employees of Catholic
institutions to a specific “duty of loyalty.”524 The nature of this duty, however,
varied with the employee’s religion.525 Catholics, including those who
discharged only “managerial duties,”526 were “expected to recognise and
observe the principles of Catholic doctrinal and moral teaching . . . [and]
conduct themselves in manner consistent with the principles of Catholic
doctrinal and moral teaching.”527 For non-Catholics the duty was less
demanding: they had to “respect the truths and values of the Gospel
and . . . contribute to giving them effect within the organisation.”528 The same
Basic Regulations contemplated dismissal as the last resort for the employees
who did not comply with these requirements for employment.529
JQ, a physician, was a member of the Catholic Church.530 He was employed
as the head of a medicine department of an IR hospital, and had managerial
duties.531 After he divorced and remarried, he was dismissed by IR for failing to
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531

Id. ¶ 79.
Id. ¶ 83.
Id. ¶ 2.
Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0068 (Sept. 11, 2018).
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶¶ 24, 28.
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comply with Catholic marital doctrine, which forbids divorce and remarriage.532
He sued IR in German court, arguing that he had been discriminated against on
religious grounds: such action by a Protestant doctor working in the same
hospital would not constitute a legitimate ground for dismissal.533 The German
domestic court reached out to the CJEU with a very sensitive question: could the
Catholic Church prescribe a code of moral or religious conduct for IR employees
and, more specifically, could it differentiate between Catholic employees and
those who practiced a different faith or no faith at all?534
Drawing on the Egenberger criteria, the CJEU in IR opined that the domestic
judge had to assess whether the hospital’s policy of different religious standards
for its employees was “genuine, legitimate and justified.”535 While again
deferring to the German court to make this assessment, the CJEU made its views
crystal clear.536 It suggested that “[a]dherence to . . . [the Catholic
understanding] of marriage [did] not appear to be necessary for the promotion
of IR’s ethos, bearing in mind the occupational activities carried out by JQ,
namely the provision of medical advice and care in a hospital setting and the
management” of a department.537 In its view:
a church or other organisation the ethos of which is based on religion
or belief and which manages a hospital in the form of a private limited
company cannot decide to subject its employees performing
managerial duties to a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty
to that ethos that differs according to the faith or lack of faith of such
employees, without that decision being subject, where appropriate, to
effective judicial review . . . [A] difference of treatment, as regards a
requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos, between
employees in managerial positions according to the faith or lack of
faith of those employees is consistent with that directive only if . . . the
religion or belief constitutes an occupational requirement that is
genuine, legitimate and justified in the light of the ethos of the church
or organisation concerned and is consistent with the principle of
proportionality, which is a matter to be determined by the national
courts.538
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Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 28.
Id. ¶ 27.
534
Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CC0068, ¶ 39 (May 31, 2018).
535
Id. ¶ 50 (citing Case C-414/16, Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwickiung eV,
2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0414, ¶¶ 62–63 (Apr. 17, 2018)).
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IR, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0068 ¶¶ 56–58.
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Neither the ECtHR nor the CJEU has given complete autonomy to religious
institutions in the field of labor law and employment. The ECtHR, however, has
been much more deferential to religious organizations, second guessing
decisions only at the margins. By contrast the CJEU has demanded that
denominational institutions justify their labor and employment policies and
decisions, and it has balanced religious and secular rationales in judging an
employee’s claim of religious discrimination.
3. State Aid for Religious Groups
Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de
Getafe allowed the CJEU to clarify some of the boundaries that EU law puts to
state aid to religious organizations.539 As a general rule, EU law expressly
prohibits state aid to religion to the extent that such aid “distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods.”540 There is, however, room left for the States to treat churches
and their institutions differently.
The Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania was a school owned
by the Catholic Church and located in the Spanish municipality of Getafe.541
Given its Catholic ownership, the school was governed by the Concordat or
agreement between Spain and the Holy See, entered in 1979, before Spain joined
the EU.542 In 2011, this school built a new hall for its facilities, paying the
construction tax to the municipality.543 The school, however, later submitted a
request for a tax refund,544 on the basis that the Concordat between the Holy See
and Spain accords the “complete and permanent exemption from property and
capital gains taxes and from income tax and wealth tax in respect of properties
of the Catholic Church.”545 The municipality refused the refund, and the school
sued in state court.546 The Spanish judge requested the CJEU to issue a
preliminary ruling on whether the tax exemption for Catholic-owned buildings

539
Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de Getafe, 2017 WL
CELEX 62016CJ0074 (June 27, 2017).
540
TFEU, supra note 29, art. 107 ¶ 1.
541
Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de Getafe, 2017
CELEX 62016CJ0074, ¶ 14 (Feb. 16, 2017).
542
Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶¶ 3, 8, 13 (June 27, 2017); Congregación de
Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶ 5 (Feb. 16, 2017).
543
Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶ 15 (June 27, 2017).
544
Id.
545
Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶ 9 (Feb. 16, 2017) (citation omitted).
546
Id. ¶¶ 18.
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used for non-religious purposes of education violated the EU’s prohibition on
state aid to religion.547
The CJEU’s ruling in Congregación de Escuelas drew heavily from its own
precedents on the meaning of state aid to religion—including religious
schools—and gave rather precise guidelines for the domestic court to decide.548
The Court noted that EU law did not distinguish between the religious and nonreligious nature of the identity, or the for-profit and not-for-profit nature of the
undertaking.549 What was essential to trigger the EU prohibition on state aid to
religion was whether the activity was remunerated.550 “Services [that] normally
provided for remuneration” count as an economic undertaking.551 But in this
case the school was part of the Spanish system of public education, and lived off
of “public funds” and not fees paid by students or parents.552 This put the
school’s educational activities outside the scope of the EU prohibition on state
aid to religion, the Court concluded.553 The new hall for which the local
construction tax had been levied was intended to serve only the educational
purpose of the school and could thus be properly exempt from construction
tax.554
In its opinion, the CJEU did not go as far as the AG had proposed.555 The
AG did not confine her reasoning to the tax exemption issue at stake.556 She
explored the potential tensions between EU regulations and Spanish church-state
relations, portending major possible changes in later cases.557 She hypothesized
that some tax exemptions accorded by the church-state agreement that benefit
economic activities run by Catholic institutions would likely not survive
scrutiny.558 She even envisioned that one day Spain would have to use the
dispute resolution procedures in the Concordat Between the Holy See and Spain
to reconcile its obligations toward the Catholic Church and the EU.559 The AG
forecasted even more gravely: “If, in that way, a solution in conformity with EU
547

Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶ 21 (June 27, 2017).
Id. ¶¶ 38–90.
549
Id. ¶¶ 43, 46.
550
Id. ¶ 47.
551
Id.
552
Id. ¶¶ 50, 55.
553
Id. ¶¶ 50–53.
554
Id. ¶¶ 53, 60.
555
Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de Getafe, 2017
CELEX 62016CJ0074, ¶ 94–100 (Feb. 16, 2017).
556
Id.
557
Id.
558
Id. ¶¶ 87, 99.
559
Id. ¶ 100 (citation omitted); TFEU, supra note 29, art. 107.
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law were not achieved within a reasonable space of time, Spain would have to
give notice of termination of the Agreement.”560
The AG’s prophecy about clashes between state compliance with EU
regulations and with church-state agreements561 is disturbing for those who
understand EU integration as a smooth process that does not require its Member
States to give away their traditions in order to become members of the European
Union. But even as stated, this case might well have powerful ramifications for
future religious freedom cases.562 The CJEU divided admissible from
inadmissible state aid to churches based on whether the church charged money
for its tax-exempt services.563 This has the paradoxical result of favoring
wealthy, well-endowed, and state-established churches that receive public funds
and thus do need not need to charge their users for their services. But smaller
religious groups and new educational institutions that are still making their way
into the public education system will have to pay taxes precisely because they
receive no public funds and thus need to charge fees to recoup their costs.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Law and religion in Europe have changed dramatically in the past three
decades. The European Union’s strong commitment to open borders and
freedom of movement has boosted the legal integration of Europe—Brexit
notwithstanding. The Council of Europe’s sweeping embrace of post-glasnost
Russia and many former Soviet bloc countries as well as Turkey has brought
East and West together as never before. The devastating conflicts in the Middle
East and the failed promises of the Arab Spring have driven many émigrés to
Europe in search of a better life. Many European countries have thus witnessed
a massive influx of people of different faiths, ethnicities, and languages from,
within, and beyond Europe.564 And these countries now face mounting pressure
to find common ground for the peaceful coexistence of their increasingly diverse
societies. The new challenge for Europe is two-fold: (1) how to accommodate
previously unknown religious practices now claiming religious freedom
protections and (2) how to reconceptualize old Christian traditions and cultures,

560

Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶ 100 (Feb. 16, 2017).
Id.
562
Alice Neffe, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provicina Betania v. Ayuntamento de Getafe (Case C74/16): Tax Exemption for Church Non-religious Activity as Unlawful State Aid, 7 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION
143, 152 (2018).
563
Congregación de Escuelas, 2017 CELEX 62016CJ0074 ¶¶ 38–47 (June 27, 2017).
564
VERA HANEWINKEL, FOCUS MIGRATION, DOES THE CRISIS MAKE PEOPLE MOVE? EU INTERNAL
MIGRATION BEFORE AND DURING THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS—AN OVERVIEW 2 (2013).
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long protected by local constitutions, concordats, and customs, but now under
attack.565
The two pan-European Courts sitting in Strasbourg and Luxembourg have
become litigation hotspots for resolving these hard challenges. Both the
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European
Union operate with the strong and identically-phrased religious freedom
mandates of the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights in Article 9 and
the 2010 European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Liberties in Article 10:
freedom of thought, conscience and belief for all; freedom from direct and
indirect discrimination by state and private actors; freedom to manifest one’s
beliefs in public alone and in religious groups that deserve legal personality and
religious autonomy.566
The ECtHR has interpreted Article 9 of the European Convention broadly to
protect a person’s right to hold religious beliefs in private and to manifest those
beliefs peaceably in public.567 The ECtHR has treated the “internal right to
believe” as each person’s right to accept, reject, or change his or her thoughts,
beliefs, or religious affiliation without involvement, inducement, or impediment
of the state.568 It protects a person from pressure to reveal his or her religious
identity or beliefs to the state, or to discuss religion with others. It protects
persons from being forced to swear a religious oath. It protects the rights of
pacifists to conscientiously object to military service and participation. And it
protects school children and their parents from religious teaching in state
schools, although not from classrooms that include crucifixes.
Not all claims of conscience have won relief in the two Courts. The CJEU
allowed religious refugees a right to asylum only if they could provide strong
evidence of their faith and strong evidence that they had or would face
prosecution at home because of their faith.569 The ECtHR denied conscientious
objection exemptions to pacifists whose co-religionists bore arms, whose
objections were deemed political rather than religious, or who sought to be
excused from a celebratory parade or holiday celebration far removed in time
and space from the battlefield.570 The burden on religion was not heavy enough
565

McCrudden, supra note 68, at 29.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, at 230; Charter, supra note 13, art. 10.
567
See supra Part III.A.
568
See supra Part III.A.
569
See Case C-56/17, Bahtiyar Fathi v. Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite, 2018 WL
CELEX No. 62017CJ0056 (Oct. 4, 2018).
570
See Bayatyan v. Armenia, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Aydemir v. Turkey, App. No. 26012/11 (July 9,
2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163940; Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2312.
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in those cases to warrant an exemption, in the Court’s view. Even when there
were ample burdens on conscience, the Court sometimes judged the burden on
others’ rights or on society’s values to be too heavy to grant a religious
accommodation. The ECtHR did go out of its way to accommodate the humanist
parents in Folgerø to exempt their children from generic religious instruction in
public schools.571 But it refused to accommodate the Christian Romeike family
who sought to protect their children from the secular liberal teachings of the
public schools by homeschooling them.572 The rights of children to proper state
education trumped the parents’ right to religion and religious parentage, the
Court concluded.573 Similarly, the Court denied relief to Christian private and
public employees who claimed conscientious objection from newly enacted
employment policies requiring them to serve same-sex couples.574 The rights of
same-sex couples to dignity and equal treatment, the Court concluded,
outweighed the conscientious objections of claimants who held traditional
Christian views of sexuality.575
Protecting the rights of others and the interests of society have also informed
both Courts’ rulings on limits to the right to manifest one’s religion in public.
Both Courts have repeated common human rights teachings that the right to
manifest religion includes basic rights to peaceable religious worship, speech,
press, diet, dress, holiday observance, pilgrimage, parenting, evangelization,
charity services, and more.576 While many religious claimants have won their
claims to manifest their religion in public, both Courts have been disturbingly
uneven in some of their recent judgments. The Courts have refused to
accommodate full religious holiday observance—whether the Sabbath day
claims in Sessa,577 the Islamic holidays in Kosteski and Liga van Moskeeën,578
or the Good Friday observance in Cresco.579 The ECtHR did step in several
times to outlaw blatantly discriminatory prohibitions on religious worship and
proselytizing for Protestant minorities in Orthodox European lands, claiming
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Folgerø v. Norway, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51.
See Konrad v. Germany, 2006-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 355.
573
Id. at 366.
574
See Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215.
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Id. at 261–62, ¶¶ 107–110.
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For a typical summary of religious freedom protections, see, e.g., OSCE OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS.
& HUM. RTS., FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF AND SECURITY: POLICY GUIDANCE (2019).
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Sessa v. Italy, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 165.
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Kosteski v. Macedonia, App. No. 55170/00 (Apr. 13, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00173342; Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZW and Others
v. Gewest, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 (May 29, 2018).
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Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation GmbH v. Achatzi, 2019 WL CELEX 62017CJ0193 (Jan. 22,
2019).
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these as violations of religious freedom and religious nondiscrimination norms.
But both Courts repeatedly upheld blatantly discriminatory prohibitions on
Muslim headscarves, minarets, and slaughtering houses in Western European
lands, claiming these were necessary applications of the margin of appreciation
for local resolution of disputes. The Courts added that Muslim headscarves were
demeaning to women and corrosive to society, and halal slaughtering was too
cruel to animals to be viewed as organic.580 But it is hard to resist the conclusion
that, in these pan-European Courts, Western secularist states do better than
Eastern Orthodox states; mistreated Christians do better than mistreated
Muslims; and public non-religious speech, however provocative, fares better
than public religious expression, however discrete. Indeed, in the Achbita case,
the CJEU suggested that a private company could completely ban all religious
speech, symbols, and dress in the workplace with impunity under EU law.581
With respect to religious group rights, the two Courts have begun to diverge
rather significantly. The ECtHR has been more protective. It has upheld the
rights of religious groups to maintain their own standards of teaching, practice,
membership, employment, and discipline; to devise their own forms of polity
and organization; to hold property; to lease facilities; to make contracts; to open
bank accounts; to hire and pay employees, suppliers, and service providers; to
maintain relations with coreligionists at home and abroad; to publish their
literature; and to operate worship centers, clerical housing, seminaries, schools,
charities, mission groups, hospitals, and cemeteries. The ECtHR has repeatedly
held that Member States may not arbitrarily or discriminatorily withhold,
withdraw, or condition a religious group’s right to acquire legal personality; to
procure the necessary state licenses for religious marriages, nursery schools, or
educational programs for their members; or to receive state funding or other state
benefits available to other properly registered religious groups. Nor may the state
impose an exorbitant or discriminatory tax on a religious organization that
jeopardizes the organization’s ability to operate.
By contrast, the CJEU has been less deferential to religious groups in its first
few cases on point. Rather than grant religious autonomy and deference to

580

See Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 WL CELEX 62015CJ0157 (Mar. 14, 2017);
see Patrick Weil, Headscarf Versus Burqa: Two French Bans with Different Meanings, in CONSTITUTIONAL
SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, supra note 46, at 215 (regarding France’s ban of the headscarf
and of the hijab: “this art of separation [between the private and the public sphere] . . . might explain why France
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religious employers as the ECtHR and other Western courts have done,582 the
CJEU requires domestic courts to scrutinize whether the religious affiliation and
the private morality of employees are relevant to the duties of an employee of a
religious organization.583 If not, their religious or moral conduct can have no
bearing on the employee’s status or treatment by their employer.584 Egenberger
and IR were even more specific, requiring domestic courts to balance the
competing interests of a job applicant or employee and the religious employer.585
This balance requires judges to see which were more pressing—the secular
interests, individual rights, and private life choices of an employee or job
applicant or the religious institution’s professed religious beliefs and practices.
And it would uphold the latter only if they were found “genuine, legitimate, and
justified,” while making no such demand on the private parties.586
In Congregación de Escuelas, the AG in the CJEU suggested further that,
even if a religious group’s rights claims were based on a Concordat between the
Member State and the Holy See, the right could not contradict EU regulations.587
And if that contradiction persisted, the AG mused, the CJEU “would have to
give notice of termination” of the Concordat,588 leading skeptics to worry that
local constitutional provisions on church-state relations might be next.
It is perhaps no surprise that the ECtHR in these cases has urged Member
States to adopt the principle of “neutrality” in their treatment of religion, but also
given them a wide margin of appreciation to resolve controversial issues in
accordance with local customs and norms. Given the wide variety of
constitutional settings and church-state structures in the forty-seven Member
States of the Council of Europe, the Court has tried to avoid enforcing one model
of religious freedom for all of Europe. The margin of appreciation principle has
given individual States ample leeway to implement religious freedom in
accordance with local culture and customs—a bit like the federalism principle
582
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (holding that the ministerial
exemption for religious employment was mandated by the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, and rejecting the argument that a neutral disability law should be applied); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (holding that the ministerial exemption applied to religious
schoolteachers).
583
Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwickiung eV, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0414
(Apr. 17, 2018).
584
Id.
585
Egenberger, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0414; Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018 WL CELEX
62017CJ0068 (Sept. 11, 2018).
586
IR, 2018 WL CELEX 62017CJ0068 ¶ 43.
587
Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Ayuntamiento de Getafe, 2017
CELEX 62016CJ0074, ¶ 100 (Feb. 16, 2017).
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Id.
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in American constitutional law has allowed for diversity among individual
American states in their treatment of religion.589 But in Europe that margin of
appreciation principle has sometimes come at the expense of religious
minorities—like Muslim women whose religious head coverings were
repeatedly banned or conservative Christians whose traditional sexual ethics
were repeatedly spurned. And even when the ECtHR rules that a Member State
has violated Article 9, the Court depends largely upon voluntary compliance by
the offending State, some of whom remain indifferent, which only compounds
the problem of localism.
The principle of “neutrality” has also permeated the new religious freedom
case law of the CJEU, and it, too, has been used to deny requests for religious
accommodation and autonomy. The CJEU’s Liga van Moskeeën case stated
plainly that neutral laws about slaughtering are incapable of infringing upon the
religious freedom of halal butchers.590 The “obligation to use an approved
slaughterhouse,” the Court held, “applies in a general and neutral manner to any
party that organises slaughtering of animals and applies irrespective of any
connection with a particular religion and thereby concerns in a nondiscriminatory manner all producers of meat in the European Union.”591 This
statement suggests that, for the CJEU, the ideal legislative solution for the
increasing religious pluralism of European societies might lie less in granting a
wide margin of appreciation for local customs, and more in the promulgation of
broad, neutral, and generally applicable laws binding on the entire EU. This
position echoes one of the most controversial United States Supreme Court’s
rulings in the religious freedom field, Employment Division v. Smith (1990).592
Like the Smith Court, the Liga van Moskeeën Court holds that neutral and
general laws are not violations of religious freedom, since they do not target
specific religious practices.593 This is true even if, in application, these laws
impose major burdens on the exercise of religion, particularly of minority or
disfavored religions with unusual religious practices or needs.594

589
See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 111–16, 143–49 (4th ed. 2016).
590
Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZW and
Others v. Gewest, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 (May 29, 2018).
591
Id. ¶ 61.
592
Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872, 882 (1990) (holding that Oregon’s
prohibition on the religious use of peyote does not violate the Free Exercise Clause), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v.
Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
593
Liga van Moskeeën, 2018 WL CELEX 62016CJ0426 ¶ 61.
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Id. ¶ 79.
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The CJEU transplanted this neutrality approach from earlier ECtHR cases.
But unlike the ECtHR’s neutrality rulings that depend upon voluntary
compliance by the Member State and that grant ample margins of appreciation
for local application, the CJEU’s neutrality rulings are immediately binding law
on all EU members, and they leave far less room to Member States for local
adjustments.595 Add the fact that the CJEU encourages and sometimes requires
Member State courts to second-guess a religious body’s internal judgments
when other rights or interests are affected, and that might well lead the CJEU to
superimpose a specific legal order on its Member States, mostly driven by a
secularist agenda.596 This agenda might not only discourage Member States from
accommodating religious believers and groups,597 but leave standing neutral
legal rules that have a disparate impact on religious parties.
When the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the 2011 Lautsi case addressed
the issue of whether crucifixes were permitted in Italian public school
classrooms,598 Professor Joseph Weiler, an Orthodox Jew wearing his yarmulke
in the courtroom, defended the continued display of the crucifix despite the
objections of atheist parents.599 Among other things, Weiler warned the ECtHR
not to “Americaniz[e]” Europe, by superimposing a “neutrality” model of
religious freedom and church-state relations, akin to what was being enforced in
American courts at the time.600 The European idea of neutrality first surfaced in
ECtHR cases, but this idea has influenced the CJEU as well. Time will tell if the
CJEU adopts a stronger version of religious neutrality. Ironically, the United
States Supreme Court has backed away from the Smith neutrality test in its most
recent cases, and it might soon abandon this test in favor of a more robust
protection of the free exercise of religion as had been the law before Smith.601 If
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See Mark Hill QC, Eguaglianza e non discriminazione a Strasburgo e Lussemburgo, in IL DIRITTO E IL
61, 70 (Andrea Pin ed., 2015).
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See CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COURTS, AND
BELIEFS 143 (2018).
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claims to be granted conscientious exemptions.” YOSSI NEHUSHTAN, INTOLERANT RELIGION IN A TOLERANTLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 199 (2015).
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Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
599
Oral Submission by Professor JHH Weiler on behalf of Amenia et al. – Third Party Intervening States
in the Lautsi Case Before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, ¶¶ 5, 7, 17 (June 30,
2018), https://7676076fde29cb34e26d-759f611b127203e9f2a0021aa1b7da05.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/eclj/weiler_
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See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (holding that the ministerial
exemption for religious employment was mandated by the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, and rejecting the argument that a neutral disability law should be applied); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (holding that the ministerial exemption applied to religious
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that proves true, perhaps the “Americanization” of Europe might be just what is
needed after all, at least in protecting the free exercise of religion.

schoolteachers); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (rejecting application of
a state civil rights law to a religious freedom claimant, with concurring judges urging rejection of the Smith
approach to free exercise cases).

